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Abstract 
 
This dissertation consists of three independent essays in the field of development 
economics, with a focus on human capital, labor markets, and migration in 
developing countries. The first essay analyzes the impact of remittances on 
educational investments in Nigeria, highlighting the gender gap in education. Using 
instrumental variables estimation, it finds that remittances increase the likelihood of 
school enrollment, particularly of girls, and thus help narrow the gender gap in 
education. The second essay examines whether certain forms of employment in 
Indonesia scar workers’ labor market outcomes and human capital in the long run. 
Fixed effects estimations show that casual workers and unpaid family workers are 
likely to experience scarring effects on future earnings, but little evidence is found in 
terms of scarring effects on human capital accumulation. The third essay estimates 
the effects of the massive migration of Syrian refugees on the labor market in Turkey. 
The results show that this shock affects workers differently according to their skill 
levels, and also that the regions receiving larger numbers of refugees experience 
larger effects, but the shock spreads to all regions due to regional migration of native 
workers. 	
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays in the field of development economics, with a 
focus on human capital, labor markets, and migration. In particular, the chapters in this 
dissertation shed light on issues related to female children, informal workers, and 
refugees in developing countries. 
The first essay examines the impact of remittances on educational investments 
and, more specifically, the educational gender gap in Nigeria, where girls’ educational 
attainment remains low. Globally, remittances to developing countries have more than 
doubled over the past decade. While remittances are increasingly recognized as a key 
income source in developing countries, the results of past studies of their effect on 
children’s education in recipient households remain inconclusive. This essay aims to 
contribute to this literature by highlighting how remittances can play an important role in 
increasing investments in human capital and decreasing the gender gap in education. 
Using information on migrants’ locations to instrument for remittances, the results show 
that, in general, the receipt of remittances increases both household expenditure on 
education and the likelihood that children are enrolled in school. Disaggregating the 
sample of children into age- and gender-specific groups, the paper finds that the impact 
of remittances is significant for girls but not for boys, thereby reducing the gender gap in 
school enrollment at all levels, and especially for older children. 
The second essay analyzes informal employment in Indonesia. Informality in the 
labor market is a pervasive phenomenon in developing countries. Informal workers tend 
to have less access to formal training and modern technology due to the small-scale 
nature of informal work. Consequently, workers’ human capital may not increase or may 
increase more slowly during spells of informal employment. In addition, informal 
	 2 
workers may also be stigmatized as less productive by potential employers. Either of 
these circumstances can negatively affect their future earnings and “scar” their career in 
the long run. This study uses fixed effects estimation methods to investigate the presence 
of such scarring effects on informal workers in Indonesia. It finds that while there is a 
general formal sector earnings premium, there is no discernable scarring effect of past 
informal employment on current earnings. However, a more disaggregated examination 
reveals that workers who participate in certain types of informal employment, namely 
casual work and unpaid work, experience scarring effects, especially at older ages. 
Regarding the source of this scarring, the paper finds some, albeit limited, evidence that 
human capital, as measured by tests of cognitive skills, deteriorates for workers employed 
in casual jobs. Overall, the results suggest that while there is some evidence for human 
capital depreciation, stigma likely plays a larger role; informal workers, particularly those 
with the most unfavorable jobs, may face barriers that exclude them from better jobs. 
The third essay investigates the effects of Syrian refugees on the labor market in 
Turkey.1 Since the Syrian war began in 2011, Turkey has received over 2.8 million 
refugees, becoming the largest host country in the world. This essay builds and 
estimates/calibrates a model using detailed micro data from Turkey to quantify the labor 
market effects of this sudden and massive migration wave. Low and high skill workers 
self-select into different regions based on idiosyncratic preferences and mobility costs, 
while firms within each region can exploit two margins of informality: to register or not 
register their business, the extensive margin; and whether to hire their workers formally 
or informally, the intensive margin. Minimum distance calibration and direct estimation 
from micro data are combined to characterize the pre-shock, baseline Turkish economy 
and then the calibrated model is used to perform counterfactual exercises. The results 
show that although the inflow of Syrian refugees induces an increase in informality 
among low skill workers, it also generates both a reduction in informality among high 
skill workers and a rise in the skill premium. Furthermore, while the regions receiving 
																																																								1	This chapter is joint work with Norman Loayza (World Bank) and Gabriel Ulyssea (University of 
Oxford). 
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larger numbers of refugees experience larger effects, the shock spreads to all regions due 
to regional migration of native workers.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Impact of Remittances on Educational Investment 
and the Gender Gap in Nigeria 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Remittances to low- and middle-income countries have steadily increased over the past 
few decades, reaching $443.8 billion in 2014 (World Bank, 2017). Although they 
declined slightly in 2015 and 2016 due to economic stagnation in advanced countries, 
remittances still represent more than three times the total amount of official development 
assistance (ODA) and are projected to increase again over the next three years (World 
Bank, 2017). When flows of unrecorded remittances through informal channels are 
considered, the actual magnitude of remittance flows to developing countries is likely to 
be much larger. Unlike ODA, which flows through official channels and usually with 
conditions, remittances go directly to households with few or no conditions and are 
increasingly understood to be an important income source in developing countries.  
Accompanying this global trend is a growing body of literature that attempts to 
examine the impacts of remittances on development outcomes. Prior studies suggest that 
remittances are associated with reduced poverty and improved child health, and that they 
tend to exacerbate inequality and decrease households’ labor supply (Adams, 2011). In 
contrast, the impact of remittances on education remains inconclusive. On one hand, 
remittances may contribute to higher investment in education by relaxing households’ 
resource constraints (Cox and Ureta, 2003). On the other hand, households may require 
their children to work in place of their family members who migrate, thereby sacrificing 
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their education (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). Hence, the empirical results examining 
the impact of remittances on education tend to vary across studies. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this literature by examining the 
impact of remittances on educational investment and school enrollment in Nigeria, a 
country that faces the twin challenges of expanding human capital and reducing gender 
inequality. According to recent estimates by the World Bank (2017), Nigeria is the top 
remittance receiving country in Africa and the fifth largest in the world. In 2017, Nigeria 
is estimated to have received $22.3 billion in remittances, which accounts for about 60% 
of the total remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria’s economy is performing better 
than the average in Sub-Saharan Africa;1 yet, it is falling behind in terms of education 
compared to other countries. For example, the primary school net enrollment rate in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region was 76% in 2010, but only 64% for Nigeria. The figure for 
girls is particularly low, at 58%, compared to 69% for boys.2 In addition, Nigeria has a 
low rate of progression to senior secondary education after compulsory basic education, 
the latter of which consists of six years of primary and three years of junior secondary: 
less than one-third of children who complete basic education advance to senior secondary 
school.3  
Given the aforementioned unique features of Nigeria, the main contributions of 
this paper are twofold. First, the paper specifically addresses the difference in the impact 
of remittances on children’s schooling by the gender of the children. Secondly, only a 
few studies on this subject have focused on African countries due to scarce data for this 
region. Given that Nigeria receives the highest amount of remittances in the region and 
that the issue of gender inequality remains persistent in that country, the analysis of 
Nigeria may have important policy implications that have not been identified by past 
studies, which have focused on other regions.  
																																																								
1 Nigeria’s GPD per capita (in PPP) in 2016 was $5,861, while the average in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
$3,724 (available from the World Bank World Development Indicators (database): 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD) 
2 Available from the World Bank World Development Indicators (database): 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR  
3 Available from the website of the United States Embassy in Nigeria: 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/nigeria/487468/pdfs/JanuaryEducationFactSheet.pdf	
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on 
the impact of remittances on education. Section 2.3 presents the estimation strategy, and 
Section 2.4 describes the data employed in this paper. Section 2.5 presents the estimation 
results. The last section concludes with implications for policy and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2.2 Background  
There are several possible ways that remittances are used by recipient households. In 
principle, remittances relax liquidity constraints and are treated the same as any other 
income source. Yet it is possible that remittances are more likely to be invested at the 
margin than are other sources of income, which is an implication of the permanent 
income hypothesis. Remittances can be viewed as a temporary increase in income, and 
thus households may prefer to use them to accumulate assets, including physical capital 
and human capital such as education, instead of spending them on consumption goods 
(Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010a). 
The latter view is supported by Yang (2008), who analyzed how appreciation of 
the currency of a migrant’s destination country against the Philippine peso during the 
Asian financial crisis, through which remittances (measured in Philippine pesos) increase, 
affects recipients’ households. He found that increases in remittances caused by this 
exogenous shock tend to be invested rather than consumed. In particular, Yang (2008) 
found that it increases household investment in education and the likelihood that children 
are enrolled in school instead of participating in the labor force. Similarly, the study by 
Adams and Cuecuecha (2010b) found that remittances are used more for educational 
investment rather than for consumption when studying remittance-receiving households’ 
spending patterns in Guatemala. They found that the receipt of domestic or international 
remittances increases households’ spending on education by 377% or 194%, respectively.  
Previous studies also find heterogeneous effects of remittances on education 
across demographic subgroups. Bansak and Chezum (2009) examined the impact of 
remittances on school enrollment in Nepal. The authors found that the impacts are 
positive in general and highly significant for younger children, especially males. In 
	 7 
contrast, a positive impact of remittances is observed particularly for female children by 
Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow (2009), who used data from Ecuador. They also observed that 
remittances increase the probability of school enrollment among children in rural regions. 
Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez (2014) extended the subject by analyzing the impact 
of remittances on schooling, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Their results reveal 
that remittances in Nepal tend to raise enrollment in public secondary and tertiary 
schools, and their impact is larger for poorer and rural households. They also found that 
remittances help children in relatively wealthier families or with educated mothers to 
move from public to higher-quality private schools. Similarly, Salas (2014) showed that 
international remittances increase the possibility that children receive education in private 
schools in Peru.  
While many studies have found positive impacts of remittances on education, 
remittances can, in theory, have negative effects on children’s schooling. The absence of 
adult family members can create extra pressure on children to work instead of going to 
school. In addition, if parents migrate and children are left-behind, parental absence may 
adversely affect children’s education due to less parenting inputs and psychological costs 
(Zhang et al., 2014). Furthermore, if migrants have jobs that do not demand higher 
education, return on educational investment may be considered unattractive to recipient 
households, thereby reducing children’s schooling (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). For 
example, Lopez-Cordova (2005) showed that remittances reduce school attendance 
among older teenagers in Mexico.  
 
2.3 Estimation Strategy 
This paper focuses on two outcome variables: i) household expenditure on education; and 
ii) school enrollment of children. The first outcome to be estimated is households’ 
spending on education: 
                        !! = !! + !!!! + !!′!! + !!"                                                            (2.1) 
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where Eh denotes household h’s expenditure on education; Xh is the amount of 
remittances household h receives;4 Hh denotes a vector of household characteristics such 
as the education and religion of the household head, the number of school-age children, 
household size, asset ownership, and geographic location; and ε1h is an error term. 
Household assets are used to generate an indicator of household wealth by constructing 
an asset index based on principal components analysis. The assets considered in this 
index include the ownership of a house, of agricultural and non-agricultural land, of other 
buildings, and of refrigerators, televisions, cars, and motorcycles.  
The second equation to be estimated is the following linear probability model: 
           !!! = !! + !!"!! + !!!!! + !!′!! + !!′!! + !!!!                                (2.2) 
where Sih is a binary variable with the value of 1 if a child i in household h is enrolled in 
school, and 0 otherwise; Rh is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if household h 
receives remittances; Bi denotes the gender of child i (Bi =1 indicates a boy, and 0 
otherwise); Ci is a vector of individual child characteristics such as age; Hh denotes a 
vector of household characteristics; and ε2ih is an error term. While the amount of 
remittances is used for equation (2.1) for an easier interpretation (as elasticity), the 
amount is more subject to possible measurement errors due to recalling problems than the 
dichotomous variable. Thus, the main results for the equation (2.2) are estimated using a 
binary variable, but estimations based on the amount variable will be also presented in 
the robustness check section.  
The estimations are conducted for two different samples of children, divided into 
age groups; the first group corresponds to compulsory education (primary and junior 
secondary school age group, age 6–14) and the second group corresponds to non-
compulsory education (senior secondary age group, age 15–17). While these boundary 
ages for these two categories are based on the transition between compulsory and non-
compulsory education, another importance in separating older children from younger 
ones is that girls tend to get married or pregnant at the latter age group, which may 
prevent them from attending school. In Nigeria, the mean age at first marriage of 																																																								
4 Education expenditure and the amount of remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation so that we can consider the case of zero for these variables. This transformation also allows 
for an interpretation similar to that of the log transformation.	
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adolescent girls ages 18 and 22 is 15.9, and one in four adolescent girls are found to have 
been married at ages between 15 and 17 (World Bank, 2016). Therefore, girls in this age 
group may have a higher likelihood of not continuing education. In addition, this paper 
presents estimates of differential impacts of remittances by the gender of the child. This 
is done by adding an interaction term between the remittance dummy variable and the 
gender dummy variable to equation (2.2). 
When estimating the impact of remittances on development outcomes, an 
important issue is the endogeneity of remittances, which may arise due to simultaneity 
and omitted variables. For example, a household’s decision to have a family member 
migrate for additional income may be made at the same time as the decision to enroll a 
younger child in a school. Furthermore, some unobservable household characteristics, 
such as ambition and risk preferences, may influence both remittances and school 
enrollment or educational expenditure. For these reasons, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimations are highly likely to yield biased estimates.5 
To control for endogeneity of remittances, all of the above equations are 
estimated using instrumental variables (IVs), in which the first stage equations for 
remittance variables are: 
          !! = !! + !!′!! + !!′!! + !!"                                                                 (2.3) 
                   !! = !! + !!"′!! + !!"!! + !!′!! + !!′!! + !!!!                                (2.4) 
where !! is a set of instruments excluded from equations (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. 
This paper uses a set of migrants’ location dummies as IVs to proxy for transaction costs, 
which differ according to the source places of remittances.6 The majority (66%) of 
migrants are currently located in urban areas of Nigeria, 12% are in rural areas of Nigeria, 
and the major destinations for international migrants are European countries (10%), 
followed by the United States/Canada (6%), other Africa (5%), and other regions (1%). 
These instrumental variables must be correlated with the value or receipt of remittances 
																																																								
5 Estimation results based on OLS are presented in section 2.5.3 for robustness check. 
6 Here, transaction costs refer not only to fees incurred to formal channels of transferring remittances, but 
also to costs associated with informal channels, such as travel costs for carrying remittances by hand or 
through friends and relatives. Note that the destination dummy variables may also capture other important 
differences across the origins of remittances, such as economic situations and infrastructure availability. 
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(the relevance restriction) and can affect the child’s schooling only through their effect on 
remittances (the exclusion restriction). 
The first condition is validated by weak instrument tests, presented in all 
estimation tables in Section 2.5. Regarding the second condition, transaction costs can 
affect the amount and frequency of remittances, but are unlikely to influence school 
enrollment or educational expenditure directly; thus, they should be uncorrelated with the 
error terms in equations (2.1) and (2.2). A plausible threat to the validity of this claim is 
households’ unobservable characteristics, as discussed above. One might argue that some 
households’ higher taste for education may send more family members to a better 
location outside their towns for educational purposes, as well as children at origin to 
school. However, while education can be a crucial reason for migration in general, 
variation in the choice of destination is more likely to be due to other reasons. In fact, 
prior studies suggest that a migrant’s choice of destination is largely driven by the 
presence of social networks (International Organization for Migration, 2017), and also 
colonial ties in case of international migration (Ratha et al., 2011). Nevertheless, to 
address the possible concern, a number of relevant variables for household characteristics 
are included in estimations. 
Potential alternatives for IVs are found in other studies, including migration 
network and the availability of bank offices. The existence of a migration network is 
often used as an IV by previous literature on migration and remittances (see, for example, 
Acharya and Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). As a robustness check, the paper tested the 
migration prevalence rate per district as an IV, but it did not pass the relevance 
restriction.7 Similar to this study, Calero, Bedi, and Sparrow (2009) use the source 
countries of remittances as IVs and add the availability of Western Union bank offices to 
proxy for accessibility to channels for transmitting remittances to Ecuador. Following 
their study and other studies (see, for example, Mansour, Chaaban, and Litchfield, 2011), 
this paper explored the possibility of using the bank account ownership rate per district as 
																																																								
7 The first-stage F-statistics on excluded instruments were less than 13 for some cases. The results with this 
IV are discussed in section 2.5.3 for robustness check.  
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an IV, but it failed to pass the weak instrument test.8 This can be due to the fact that 
informal channels (e.g., carried by hand or through friends) are still commonly used for 
remittances in Nigeria: more than half of domestic remittances are transferred through 
informal channels, and these figures for international remittances are at around 20–40 % 
(Ratha et al., 2011). Additionally, the paper also considered using the number of older 
siblings as an IV, which is likely to affect the probability of receiving remittances. 
However, the sample size is reduced due to insufficient data.9 Hence, this paper focuses 
on the destination variables for the main results. 
 
2.4 Data 
The paper draws on data from the 2009 Migration Household Survey in Nigeria, which 
was implemented by the World Bank.10 The sample considered in the analysis consists of 
1,365 households with school-age children, that is children who are 6–17 years old. The 
households are categorized into three types: i) 291 households with international 
migrants; ii) 513 households with internal migrants; and iii) 561 households with no 
migrants. Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of household characteristics.11 As the 
sample considers only those households who have school-age children, the average 
household size is relatively large, with 7.89 members excluding migrants, of which 3.06 
are school-age children. On average, households have 1.42 migrants. A migrant is 
defined in the survey as a person who used to live in the household, but had left to live 
outside the household since January 1, 2000 and was still living away at the time of 
interview in 2009. The household heads have received 6.71 years of education on average. 
Seventy-one percent of households are Muslims, while the rest are Christians or follow 
other religions. Forty-one percent reside in urban areas, while 59% live in rural areas. 																																																								
8 The first-stage F-statistics on excluded instruments were less than 13 for all specifications. The results 
with this IV are discussed in section 2.5.3 for robustness check. 
9 The results with this IV are discussed in section 2.5.3 for robustness check. 
10 The data set is available at the World Bank’s Microdata Library website  
(http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/home), and the reference ID number for the 2009 Migration 
Household Survey in Nigeria is NGA_2009_MRHSS_v01_M. 
11 The sample was selected to oversample areas in the south region to have enough coverage for households 
with international migrants. Therefore, it is crucial to weight the data, and sample weights are used in all 
analyses and statistics presented. 
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Table 2.2 provides information on ownership of various assets. More than two-thirds of 
households own a house or agricultural land, while less than one-third possess durable 
goods such as a refrigerator or a car. 
Based on the expenditure in the past six months, food consumption accounts for a 
little more than half of total household expenditures (53%). On average, education 
constitutes 4.8% of total expenditure. Looking further into expenditure on education, 
households with international migrants allocate the highest budget share to education, 
approximately 1.5 times as much as households with internal migrants and more than 
twice the share spent by households without migrants (Figure 2.1). Among households 
with international migrants, 80.1% receive remittances, while 49.9% of households with 
internal migrants receive them. Fifty-five percent of migrants who send money are 
children of household heads, 29% are brothers or sisters of household heads, and the rest 
are other relatives, such as grandchildren and children-in-law. Based on reports by 
recipient households, Figure 2.2 illustrates how those remittances are spent in recipient 
households. The statistics indicate that education comprises a large share in the use of 
remittances (28.6%). 
Figure 2.3 presents the data at the individual child level for school-age children. 
The statistics show that male children’s enrollment rate decreases as they progress in 
their education, but the decline is minimal. In contrast, the school enrollment rate of 
female children significantly drops for ages 15–17 (equivalent to the senior secondary 
school ages): only 56% of female children who are age 15–17 are in school. This decline 
suggests that after completion of compulsory education, girls’ continued education is not 
a high priority and the gender gap widens at older ages.  
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Impact on Educational Investment 
First, I analyze the impact of remittances on educational investment using an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach.12 F-statistics for the instruments show that they have explanatory 
power and thus they are not weak IVs. The test of over-identifying restrictions is also 																																																								
12 The first-stage regression results are presented in Appendix Table A.1. 
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passed in all cases. As shown in Table 2.3, in general, a 10% increase in the amount of 
remittances leads to approximately a 1% increase in expenditure on education (column 
1). As expected, household expenditure on education increases as the number of school-
age children increases. In addition, household wealth, proxied by an asset index, is 
positively associated with educational investment. Urban location is also statistically 
significant and positive. In contrast, Islamic households are negatively correlated with 
investment in education. The possible explanation for this result can be that, historically, 
Christian missionary schools concentrated in Christian communities, and thus educational 
infrastructure was less developed in Islamic communities, especially in the northern 
region of Nigeria (Lincove, 2009). Furthermore, traditional practices and beliefs in 
Islamic households may prevent girls from attending schools, which may contribute to 
lowering total educational investment.  
When the sample is disaggregated by age (Table 2.3, columns 2 and 3), the 
impact of remittances on educational expenditure differs by age groups. For households 
with children in the compulsory education age group (age 6–14), the impact of 
remittances is positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the effect is smaller and 
not significant for households with children in the senior secondary age group (age 15–
17). Considering that basic education is relatively inexpensive (state-owned schools are 
free though students are responsible for purchasing books and uniforms), households may 
be more willing to finance younger children’s education when they receive extra money. 
In addition, older children have higher opportunity costs of education, as they can work 
more and take care of younger siblings if they forgo their education. For these reasons, 
households may decide to spend money at the margin for younger children. As the data 
on household expenditures are available only at the household level, I cannot detect the 
differential impact of remittances by the gender of children, so this question is examined 
in the next section using the individual data.13 
 																																																								
13 As a possible approach to solve this issue on household expenditure, I explored the possibility of using 
the gender composition of the children, specifically, the proportion of boys among children in the 
household. However, because the data set does not include information on expenditure specific to each 
child, this variable still cannot perfectly capture the differential impact of remittances by the gender of 
children. The results with this variable are reported in Appendix Tables A.2-A.3. 
	 14 
2.5.2 Impact on School Enrollment 
This subsection examines the general impact of remittances on school enrollment using 
the child level data. Table 2.4 presents the IV estimation results for three different 
samples.14 F-statistics for the instruments easily exceed the threshold of 13, which 
indicates that the IVs have sufficient strength, and the test of over-identifying restrictions 
are far from statistically significant. The results show that the receipt of remittances 
increases the probability that children go to school at all levels of education, with impacts 
between 10 to 16 percentage points.15 The coefficient of the gender dummy is significant 
only for the older children of senior secondary school age, indicating that boys are 11.4 
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school for this age group, in comparison 
to girls. Gender discrimination is much smaller and not statistically significant for the 
younger age group.16 Families in urban areas are more likely to send their children to 
schools. By contrast, households whose religion is Islam are estimated to have a lower 
likelihood of children’s school enrollment by 10.6 percentage points for the younger age 
group and by 22.8 percentage points for the older age group.17 
To investigate whether the effect of remittances on enrollment varies by gender, 
an interaction between the gender dummy variable and the remittance-receiving dummy 
variable is added to the next specification. The first column in Table 2.5 shows that the 
coefficient of remittance receipt is positive, while its interaction with the boy dummy is 
negative, which implies that in households with remittances, the positive impact of 
remittances on school enrollment is larger for girls than boys. More specifically, the 
receipt of remittances increases the likelihood of girls being in school by 21.1 percentage 
points, whereas that of boys increases by only 4.8 percentage points, but this is 
																																																								
14 The first-stage regression results are presented in Appendix Table A.4. 
15 Note that the difference in coefficients on the remittance variable between columns (2) and (3) is not 
statistically significant. 
16	Note that the difference in coefficients on the boy variable between columns (2) and (3) is statistically 
significant.	
17 As an additional exercise, the interaction between the boy variable and the Islam variable was added to 
the model to test the possible gender bias among Islamic households, but the coefficient on the interaction 
term was not statistically significant.  
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statistically insignificant.18 Therefore, girls are more likely to benefit from remittances 
than boys in remittance-receiving households. In contrast, the boy dummy is positive, 
which implies that in non-remittance receiving households, boys have a higher likelihood 
of going to school than girls.  
When the sample is disaggregated by age sub-groups, the magnitudes of the 
impacts are somewhat different (Table 2.5, Columns 2 and 3). Specifically, for children 
between 6 and 14 years old, the probability of girls’ enrollment rises by 17.0 percentage 
points in remittance-receiving households. In contrast, the impact on girls is much larger 
for older children aged 15–17: the probability of girls’ enrollment increases by 28.5 
percentage points. In both estimations, the impact of remittances on boys is not 
statistically significant.19 These results suggest that the positive impact of remittances on 
school enrollment is larger for girls than for boys, and thus remittances significantly help 
to reduce the gender gap in school enrollment in all age groups. Furthermore, this is 
especially so for older children. In the older age group, the boy dummy is significant and 
positive, which means that in non-remittance recipient households, boys are more likely 
to be enrolled in school. Girls’ education at higher levels may often be sacrificed due to 
various reasons, such as marriage and household chores, but remittances have the 
potential of contributing to narrowing the gender gap in education for older children. 
 
2.5.3 Robustness Checks 
In addition to the IV estimations, other estimation strategies are also tested to estimate the 
impact of remittances on educational expenditure and school enrollment. Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimations produce results similar to the IV estimates, as seen in 
Appendix Tables A.5-A.7. The estimated coefficients of the remittance variables are 
slightly smaller using OLS estimation, but their signs are consistent with the results from 
the IV estimations.  
																																																								
18 For boys, 4.8 percentage points are calculated by summing the coefficients for a remittance recipient 
dummy (0.211) and its interaction with a boy dummy variable (-0.163). However, this is statistically 
insignificant, as shown in the p-value at the bottom row in Table 2.5. 
19 See the p-values at the bottom row in Table 2.5. 
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Other alternative specifications have also been estimated. For the school 
enrollment specification, the level of remittances is used as an alternative explanatory 
variable. Tables A.8-A.9 show that the results are very similar to the case using the 
binary variable for the receipt of remittances in terms of signs and significance. In 
general, a 1% change in the amount of annual remittances is associated with a 0.01 
percentage point increase in the likelihood that children are enrolled in school. The 
average annual remittance is approximately $515, so the estimates imply that sending a 
remittance of $43 per month is likely to increase the probability of children’s school 
enrollment by 1 percentage point.20 For the case of school enrollment with the level of 
remittances, the IV probit model is also employed instead of the linear probability model 
with the IVs. As shown in Appendix Tables A.10-A.11, the signs and significance of the 
estimated coefficients for remittance variables are consistent with the results using the 
linear probability model. Hence, the main results are robust to different estimation 
methods. 
One might also consider extending the upper boundary for age, given that some 
children older than 17-year-old may be still enrolled in senior secondary schools. To 
check the sensitivity of results to the choice of sample, the paper replicated estimations 
for Table 2.5, extending the upper boundary for age to 19, and the results are presented in 
Table A.12. Columns (1) and (3) in Table A.12 show that the results are qualitatively 
similar to Table 2.5, but the values for the remittance variable are slightly smaller when 
older children beyond 17 are added to the sample. This change may reflect the fact that 
older girls have higher opportunity costs of attending school, which reduces the positive 
effects of remittances on girls who are 18 or 19 years old. Nevertheless, remittances still 
contribute to reducing the gender gap in education for older children. 
Additionally, other possible alternatives for IVs are examined. As discussed in 
section 2.3, the migration prevalence rate and the bank account prevalence rate do not 
always pass the relevance restrictions, but the results show that the significance of 
remittances remains robust and the estimates are larger in magnitude (Tables A.13–A.15 																																																								
20 The original amount in local currency was converted to US dollars by using an exchange rate as of 2009 
December ($1 = 149.69 Naira). 
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and Tables A.16–A.18, respectively). Table A.19 presents the results using the number of 
older siblings as an IV. Although the variable of interest is no longer significant, possibly 
due to a large reduction in sample size, the magnitude is still similar. Therefore, the core 
results are robust to alternative specifications. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Nigeria is a country of great potential, with an abundance of human resources, but its low 
level of investments in education remains a key challenge. One of the keys to realize 
Nigeria’s potential lies in increasing investments in human capital and closing the gender 
gap in education. As one of the largest remittance-receiving countries, remittances can 
play an important role in achieving these goals. Understanding the impact of remittances 
on children’s education in recipient households provides policy guidance with respect to 
enhancing human capital in that country.    
Based on the IV estimations, this study finds that remittances increase the amount 
of household expenditure on education. It also finds that when the amount of remittances 
increases by 10%, educational spending rises by approximately 1%. This result is 
significant, especially for households with younger children. 
This paper then examines the impact of remittances on children’s enrollment, and 
finds that remittances increase the likelihood of school enrollment at all levels of 
education. However, a further examination reveals that the impact of remittances on 
school enrollment is statistically significant only for girls, and at both age levels. The 
estimations show that the probability of girls’ enrollment, in general, rises by 21.1 
percentage points when households receive remittances. This effect is large, especially 
for older children. Therefore, remittances are found to narrow the gender gap at older 
ages, and this finding can be important for a country such as Nigeria, where girls’ 
schooling after the first nine years of compulsory education appears to be a lower priority.  
Recognizing the important role the remittances plays in development, the 
international community has been making efforts to reduce the cost of sending 
remittances to low- and middle-income countries, as seen in the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which set the target of transaction costs to be 
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less than 3%. However, the global average remains at 7.2% in 2017, and 9.1% in Sub-
Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2017). The findings from this study on the positive impact 
of remittances on educational investments and the gender gap provide further evidence of 
the importance of facilitating the flow of remittances through efforts such as reductions in 
transaction costs. 
In sum, the results suggest that while remittances are likely to help bridge the 
gender gap in education, Nigeria may still need policies particularly targeted at helping 
girls’ transition into senior secondary school to further close the gap at that level. 
However, it should be noted that one limitation of this study lies in the data availability of 
household expenditure as they are observed only at the household level. In order to 
capture the gender bias in intra-household allocation of remittances, future research can 
extend the analysis by collecting data on educational expenditure for individual children.  
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Figure 2.1: Education Expenditure by Household Types (% of total expenditure, sample weighted) 
 
Note: Expenditure reflects the amount spent in the past six months. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Use of Remittances (sample weighted) 
% of total remittances in the past twelve months, mean 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: School Enrollment by Age Group (sample weighted) 
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Table 2.1: Household Characteristics (sample weighted) 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Household size 1365 7.89 4.02 2 24 
Number of children (age 6-17) 1365 3.06 2.00 1 16 
Number of migrants 1365 1.42 2.05 0 20 
Household head schooling (years) 1365 6.72 6.10 0 24 
Household religion (Islam if 1, otherwise 0) 1365 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Urban (urban if 1, otherwise 0) 1365 0.41 0.49 0 1 
		 		 		 		 		 		
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2009 Migration Household Survey. 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Household Assets (sample weighted) 
Variable Owns  (% of households) 
House 68.0 
Agricultural land 74.6 
Non-agricultural land 38.9 
Other buildings 11.6 
Refrigerator 24.6 
Television 47.9 
Car or truck 15.9 
Motorcycle or scooter 32.9 
		 		
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2009 Migration Household Survey. 
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Table 2.3: Impact of Remittances on Educational Expenditure (IV estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Expenditure on education 
        
Households with children of: 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.102 ** 0.095    **     0.070 
        (in the past 12 months) (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.061)  
 
         
Number of school-age children 0.247 ** 0.182      0.381 **  
       in household (0.124)  (0.124)   (0.167)   
           
Household size 0.006  -0.002    -0.009   
        (0.075)  (0.073)   (0.084)   
           
Household head's schooling years 0.009 
 
0.007     0.007 
   (0.032)  (0.032)   (0.050)  
           
Asset index 0.640 *** 0.621   ***     0.776 *** 
        (0.186)  (0.190)   (0.245)   
           
Islam -1.806 *** -1.973   ***   -1.972 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.467)  (0.463)   (0.634)   
           
Urban 2.465 *** 2.569             ***    2.740 *** 
       (=1 if living in urban, 0 if in rural) (0.593)  (0.585)   (0.682)   
           
Constant 6.740 *** 7.278   ***    6.255 *** 
  (0.572)  (0.563)   (0.586)   
             
Observations 1365   1186        735   
R-squared 0.298   0.313     0.349   
F-statistic (Instruments) 65.0  61.2      44.7  
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.151  0.136   0.221  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses.  
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Education expenditure and remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. IVs include migrants’ location dummies. Sample weights are used. 
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Table 2.4: Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment (IV estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.120 ** 0.097 **     0.158 * 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.055) (0.057) 
 
(0.086)  
    
 
  
Boy  0.051 ** 0.028 
 
   0.114 *** 
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.039)  
    
 
  
Age of the child -0.012 
 
-0.000      -0.052 *** 
       (in the past 12 months) (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.015)   
 
         
Number of school-age children 0.000 
 
-0.005      0.015 
        in household (0.012)  (0.011)   (0.016)   
           
Household head's schooling years 0.008 ** 0.009 **   *   0.006 
   (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.006)  
           
Asset index 0.022 * 0.006       0.064 *** 
        (0.012)  (0.015)   (0.020)   
           
Islam -0.139 *** -0.106   **   -0.228 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.047)  (0.052)   (0.063)   
           
Urban 0.187 *** 0.193             ***    0.179 *** 
       (=1 if living in urban, 0 if in rural) (0.047)  (0.058)   (0.056)   
           
Constant 0.765 *** 0.660   ***    1.350 *** 
  (0.130)  (0.142)   (0.276)   
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
R-squared 0.175   0.142     0.349   
F-statistic (Instruments) 66.5  61.8      43.3  
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.215  0.188   0.278  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. IVs include migrants’ location dummies. Sample weights are used. 
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Table 2.5: Differential Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment by Children’s Gender (IV 
estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.211 *** 0.170    **     0.285 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.089)   
           
Boy * Received remittances -0.163 *** -0.133 **    -0.216 ***  
  (0.053)  (0.062)   (0.078)   
           
Boy  0.084 **  0.054     0.163   *** 
        (0.035)  (0.036)   (0.046)   
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
R-squared 0.175   0.142     0.305   
F-statistic (Remittance) 74.1  58.6      33.1  
F-statistic (Boy*Remittance) 25.4  30.1      19.6  
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.370  0.318    0.087  
Test Received remittances + 
Boy*Received remittances=0 (p-value) 0.322  0.518     0.463  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. IVs include migrants’ location dummies and their interaction terms with the boy variable. Sample 
weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The “Scarring” Effects of Informal Employment in 
Indonesia 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In developing countries, informal labor constitutes a large share of employment. Informal 
labor generally refers to workers who are employed without an official contract, or in 
jobs that are not subject to government tax and labor regulations. Accordingly, they do 
not receive worker benefits and protections that formal workers typically enjoy (Cano-
Urbina, 2015). Moreover, these workers tend to receive lower wages than those with 
formal jobs (Alcaraz, Chiquiar, and Ramos-Francia, 2011; El Badaoui, Strobl, and 
Walsh, 2008). Yet, few of them ever move to formal jobs. 
Two possible mechanisms have been proposed to explain the unfavorable 
situation faced by informal workers. First, informal workers are less likely to have access 
to formal training and modern production technology due to the small-scale nature of 
informal work (Naidoo, Packard, and Auwalin, 2015). Consequently, workers’ human 
capital may not increase, or may increase more slowly, during spells of informal 
employment, which may scar their career in the long run and thus leave them behind in 
the labor market. Alternatively, informal workers may be stigmatized as less productive 
workers by potential employers and thus they may experience greater barriers to better 
jobs after they enter the informal sector. This paper defines both of these mechanisms, in 
which previous work history leads to lower future earnings, as “scarring effects.” How 
does informal employment affect workers’ future labor market outcomes? This paper 
seeks to address this question.  
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 There is limited research on the scarring effects of informal employment. Instead, 
previous studies have largely focused on the scarring effects of unemployment in 
developed countries. An earlier literature finds that spells of unemployment tend to result 
in future wage losses and less chance of future employment (see, for example, Jacobson, 
LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993, for the United States; Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor, 
2000, for the United Kingdom; and Theodossiou and Zarotiadis, 2010, for Greece). These 
negative effects can be persistent over time. Using British data, Arulampalam (2001) 
shows that a spell of unemployment leads to 6% loss in wages for the subsequent job, 
relative to those who made an employment-to-employment transition, and this loss 
increases to 14% after three years of re-employment.  
 In recent years, research has expanded to include different types of work. For 
example, Stewart (2007) analyzes the scarring effects of low-wage jobs in the United 
Kingdom and finds that a negative impact of low-wage jobs on the probability of future 
employment is as large as that of unemployment. Similar results are also found for 
Germany by Mosthaf (2014). Mavromaras, Sloane, and Wei (2015) extend the study by 
examining the scarring effects of skills under-utilization on the likelihood of 
unemployment in Australia. Their results suggest that workers who under-utilize their 
skills in their current jobs are more likely to experience unemployment in the following 
period than those who currently well-utilize their skills. 
 While evidence is still scarce, there are a few recent papers that examine the 
scarring effects of informality in developing countries. Cruces, Ham, and Viollaz (2012) 
find that informal employment during a worker’s youth leads to wage penalties in the 
early years of adulthood in Argentina and Brazil. Closely related to this paper, Naidoo, 
Packard, and Auwalin (2015) study the labor market scarring of self-employment in 
Indonesia. Their estimates indicate that one year of self-employment in the past leads to a 
loss of about 3–4% in current wages for young workers, but they find no negative effects 
for older workers. 
 Building on the existing literature, the goal of this paper is to analyze whether 
certain forms of employment can impede workers’ human capital accumulation and 
income growth in Indonesia, where approximately 52% of workers were employed 
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informally in 2015 (Allen, 2016). This study makes two contributions to the literature. 
First, past studies on labor market scarring effects are mostly limited to the effects of 
unemployment or low-wage formal employment, and usually focus on developed 
countries, for which adequate data are available. In developing countries, the 
unemployment rate is generally lower than that of developed countries and is not a major 
concern (Fields, 2011). A more pressing problem in developing countries is that the poor 
are working, yet poverty persists. Most of the poor work informally, and thus the analysis 
of scarring effects from informal employment, rather than unemployment, is likely to be 
more relevant in the context of developing countries. Utilizing newly available data from 
Indonesia, this study extends previous research efforts by applying the concept of 
scarring to specific types of informal employment, and by studying a developing 
economy. While Naidoo, Packard, and Auwalin (2015) also studied labor scarring in 
Indonesia, the design of the questionnaire changed across the survey waves that they 
examine, and this paper uses new data that make it possible to use a consistent definition 
of employment categories across the two most recent survey waves.  
Second, most of the earlier literature, including the study of Indonesia by Naidoo, 
Packard, and Auwalin (2015), attempted to examine how these (un)employment 
experiences affect future employment prospects and outcomes, mostly wages. A distinct 
contribution of this paper is that it estimates the effect not only on wages, but also on two 
different measures of human capital: general cognitive skills and numerical skills. 
Cognitive skills are increasingly recognized as an important measure of human capital, 
and prior research finds that workers accumulate cognitive skills as their experience in 
higher-skilled jobs increases (Behrman et al., 2014). Highlighting the effect on human 
capital, this paper attempts to deliver new insights for understanding the mechanisms 
through which informal employment may lead to the labor scarring effects.    
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a theoretical framework. 
Section 3.3 describes the data employed in this research. Section 3.4 presents empirical 
models, and Section 3.5 discusses the empirical results. The last section concludes and 
provides implications for policy. 
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3.2 Theoretical Framework 
Before delving into the issue of labor market scarring, it is crucial to consider why some 
people enter the informal labor market, while others enter the formal labor market. There 
are three major theoretical approaches that explain the phenomenon. The conventional 
view, grounded in the works of Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970), is that a 
labor market is segmented and informal jobs are interpreted as a means of survival or a 
last resort to those who are rationed out of the formal labor market. For them, informal 
employment is not a choice, but it is a necessity. In this model, workers with comparable 
characteristics receive different labor market returns in different sectors; in particular, 
formal workers enjoy higher labor market returns than informal workers. 
A second, competing view centers on comparative advantages of individuals. This 
argument dates back to the Roy model (1951), which posits that workers sort themselves 
into occupations of their choice based on their comparative advantages. An implication of 
the Roy model, relevant to this paper, is that self-selection does not necessarily lead the 
highest skilled workers to enter the formal labor market. In this view, some able workers 
choose to enter the informal labor market voluntarily to maximize their expected 
earnings. This idea has been empirically supported by several studies on informal self-
employment in Latin America (see, for example, Yamada, 1996, and Maloney, 2004). 
Lastly, a third view has emerged that a mix of the first two theories is plausible in 
the informal labor market (Fields, 1990). That is, the upper tiers of informal workers 
choose their jobs voluntarily, whereas the lower tiers of informal workers do so because 
of segmentation (Günther and Launoy, 2012). The reasons for voluntarily choosing the 
informal sector can, for example, include less constraints by governments and more 
flexibility (Loayza and Rigolini, 2011). 
 In the Indonesian case, however, formal jobs pay much higher wages than 
informal jobs, and earlier studies argue that informality is the result of necessity, not a 
voluntary choice (World Bank, 2010b). Of particular interest for this paper is whether 
these individuals who enter the informal labor market may experience scarring effects, 
and how these effects may differ among those workers. Whether informal employment is 
a voluntary or involuntary choice, these workers may remain in low-quality jobs that are 
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often associated with low productivity, which can hinder the country’s economic growth. 
On a personal level, those who take an informal job out of necessity may continue to be 
marginalized without job security or access to social protection.  
 The scarring effects observed in the literature can be explained by signaling 
theory and human capital theory. Signaling theory suggests that employers may regard 
spells of unemployment or low-wage employment as a negative signal of a worker’s 
productivity (Spence, 1973; McCormick, 1990; Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo, 2013). 
Hence, histories of work experience are viewed as a signal and so a stigma can be 
attached to histories that indicate low productivity.1 In contrast, human capital theory 
views work experience as an input for production rather than a signal. The classic human 
capital theory of Becker (1964) suggests that individuals increase their productivity 
through acquiring more education, training, and work experience. Workers who have 
higher human capital are paid higher wages because firms correctly view them as more 
productive. Broadly speaking, human capital skills can be disaggregated into two forms: 
general skills and firm-specific skills. General skills develop as workers accumulate 
experience with any employer and are transferrable to other types of employment, while 
specific skills improve as their tenure with a specific employer gets longer but do not 
transfer to employment with a different employer. Both types of skills can, however, 
depreciate if they are not utilized. Hence, human capital theory predicts that individuals 
may experience a loss of human capital or lower human capital accumulation during 
periods of unemployment or low-wage employment (Mosthaf, 2014). This negative effect 
on human capital can lower their subsequent wages and employment prospects, leading 
to scarring effects. 
Considering the nature of informal employment, which is generally characterized 
by low-productivity activities, scarring effects are possible from those jobs, although it is 
also possible that workers may accumulate other types of skills. Using the human capital 
measures that are available in the data set, the present study will highlight the scarring 
effects from the perspective of both the human capital theory and signaling theory. In 																																																								
1 Other related studies on signaling include, for example, Gibbons and Katz (1991) who find that workers 
displaced by layoffs have lower wages and longer spells of unemployment after displacement than those 
displaced by plant closings, albeit no difference in predisplacement wages. 
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particular, it will examine the effects of both formal and informal employment on 
cognitive skills in Section 3.5.  
 
3.3 Data 
This study draws on data from the most recent two waves (2007/2008 and 2014/2015) of 
the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), which is a longitudinal survey managed by 
the RAND Corporation. The household questionnaire covers a broad range of questions, 
including work history, labor market outcomes, and education, and the survey also 
includes cognitive assessments at the individual level. Five waves have been conducted 
since 1993, but because the definition of employment category, which is an important 
variable in this study, changed in the fourth wave (2007/2008), this study focuses on 
IFLS-4 (2007/2008) and IFLS-5 (2014/2015) to have a consistent definition for 
employment across waves.  
 There are eight categories of employment status in the survey. This paper divides 
them into informal and formal employment, following closely the official definition of 
employment categories used by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics, Badan Pusat 
Statistik (World Bank, 2010a). In particular, informal employment includes: 1) the self-
employed who do not hire any other workers; 2) the self-employed in agriculture who are 
assisted by unpaid family or temporary workers; 3) casual workers;2 and 4) unpaid family 
workers. Formal employment includes: 1) government employees; 2) private sector 
employees; 3) employers assisted by permanent employees; and 4) the self-employed in 
non-agriculture who are assisted by unpaid family or temporary workers. 
The sample considered in the analysis consists of individuals who are age 15 or 
older at the time of IFLS-4 (2007/2008) and 55 or younger at the time of IFLS-5 
(2014/1015).3 This age restriction is in order to include individuals who are of working 
age in both waves. People who are in school, retired, or sick are not included in the 
sample. To control for a bias that can arise from an irregular work schedule of casual 
																																																								
2 Casual workers refer to those who work on an irregular or flexible basis. 
3 A normal pension age in Indonesia is 55, and thus this study focuses on workers of age 55 and younger.	
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workers, this study restricts the sample to those who work at least 35 hours on average 
for a primary job and earned a positive income during the last month.4  
In this study, youth are defined as workers who were 31 years old or younger at 
the time of the IFLS-5 wave. International statistics generally consider the ages between 
15 and 24 as youth, but it is extended to 31 so that those who were 24 years old or 
younger in the IFLS-4 wave and thereby considered as youth in the former period are 
also counted in the youth sample. Highly educated workers are defined as those who have 
completed at least secondary school.  
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of employment in both waves. Based on the 
weighted sample, approximately 30% are informal workers in both years.5 The majority 
of informal workers (about half) fall into the categories of self-employment without other 
workers. The disaggregation by gender shows a slightly different composition of informal 
employment. Most women in the informal sector work as self-employed, while only one-
fifth of female informal workers are employed as casual workers. In contrast, about 40% 
of male informal workers are casual workers. The disaggregation by age group also 
illustrates a different employment distribution across age groups. A high share of youth 
(70.8%) are employed as salaried workers in the private sector, while a small share of 
youth work as self-employed or government employees. In contrast, a larger fraction of 
adults are self-employed or work as government employees. The last two columns show 
that 85% of highly educated workers are employed in the formal sector, mainly as private 
sector or government sector employees, whereas only about 60% of low-educated 
workers are employed in these sectors. 
Examining the transition in employment status between 2007 and 2014, we see 
that formal and informal workers tend to stay in their respective sectors (Table 3.2). More 																																																								
4 This leads to the exclusion of unpaid family workers from the estimations, but they are an important 
component of informal labor, and the past work experience as unpaid family workers can arguably affect 
the future outcomes. Hence, while those who were unpaid family workers at the time of survey are 
excluded, past experience as unpaid family worker is taken into account as part of their work history in the 
estimations. In addition, the top 1% of income earners and working hours are considered as outliers as they 
significantly skew the data, and they are excluded from the sample. 
5 This statistics for the share of informal labor is slightly less than other available estimates for Indonesia 
because the sample excludes unpaid family workers, which are part of informal labor and account for about 
15% of total employment. 
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specifically, government and private sector employees in the formal sector rarely switch 
to informal jobs. In contrast, about 30–40% of the workers in the other formal sector jobs 
(employers with permanent workers and the self-employed in non-agriculture with other 
temporary workers) moved to informal sector jobs, mostly into self-employment without 
other workers. As for informal workers, 19% of the self-employed without any workers 
became the self-employed with other temporary workers in non-agriculture. Also, 15–
17% of the self-employed without other workers and the self-employed with other 
temporary workers in agriculture landed private sector jobs. Combined with the trend 
observed in the formal sector, it appears that those who run their own business are 
unstable in their jobs: some of those self-employed in the informal sector are able to 
move to the formal sector, yet they also have a higher risk of subsequently transitioning 
from the formal to informal sector jobs. Another important finding is that approximately 
half of the casual workers in the initial period switched to the formal sector, of which the 
majority landed a private sector job. Hence, these casual jobs may be serving as a 
stepping-stone to a better job.  
Employment transitions oftentimes differ slightly by gender, age, and education, 
as shown in Appendix Tables B.1–B.6. Women are more likely to stay in the same 
employment type over time, compared to men. Specifically, 70% of female workers stay 
in the same employment type, while 61% of male workers do so. As one may expect, 
youth are more mobile across employment types than workers at older ages. The 
comparison between Table B.3 and Table B.4 illustrates that the older a worker becomes, 
the less chance he or she has to land a formal job after being in the informal sector. 
Tables B.5 and B.6 suggest that a larger portion of low-educated workers in the formal 
sector transitioned to the informal sector, relative to highly educated workers. Moreover, 
low-educated workers have a lower chance of moving from the informal sector to the 
formal sector than highly educated workers.  
Table 3.3 presents information on average hourly earnings by employment 
category. Although there is great variation within each category, on average, workers in 
formal employment tend to earn higher wages than workers in informal employment. 
Government sector employees earn the highest wage on average, followed by employers 
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and private sector employees. Casual workers earn the lowest wage. Overall, the statistics 
suggest that there is an earnings premium in the formal sector, as claimed in prior studies. 
The presence of formal sector premiums arguably indicates that labor market 
segmentation may be a key feature for understanding the reason for informality in 
Indonesia. Workers would choose to enter the formal sector if they have a choice, 
because they would have higher wages in the formal sector. Taking this point into 
account, Section 3.5 will examine the presence of formal sector earning premiums as well 
as the possible existence of scarring effects from informal employment. Put differently, 
this study distinguishes general earning premiums, which are measured based on the 
current employment status, from scarring effects, which are based on the past 
employment. 
Table 3.4 provides summary statistics of variables that characterize individual 
workers used in the sample. In general, educational attainment is quite low: only 11% of 
workers completed college or higher education, while 39% have just a primary education. 
A higher proportion of workers (69%) resides in urban areas than in rural areas. Workers 
are scattered across the agriculture, manufacturing, and service sectors. Sales and blue-
collar production workers account for the largest share of occupations (21% in each of 
these categories).  
Cognitive assessments in the survey consist of two evaluations: eight general 
cognitive skill questions and five mathematical questions. The general cognitive 
assessment is an abridged version of the Raven’s test, which measures fluid intelligence. 
In IFLS-5, this test was conducted for all youths and adults age 15 and older, but the test 
was given only to 15–35 year olds in IFLS-4. This limits the sample observations to those 
who were in younger age groups in the previous survey when human capital measures are 
examined, but it can still provide important insights into how human capital is affected 
for younger respondents according to types of careers. The years in each employment 
category are created based on each worker’s retrospective work history report, which 
goes back to 1999 and thus the sample considers up to the last 16 years of work 
experience. Figures B.1.a–B.1.c in the Appendix illustrate the distributions of years of 
work experience in each employment category for the latest wave (IFLS-5).  
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3.4 Empirical Framework 
The paper estimates the scarring effects of informal employment on two outcomes––
wages (or profits for the self-employed) and cognitive skills––based on the following 
equation: 
                   !!" = !! + !!′!!" + !!′!!" + !! + !! + !!"                              (3.1) 
where !!" refers to an outcome of interest (the natural logarithm of hourly earnings or a 
cognitive test score) of individual i at time t, !!" denotes a vector of past employment 
experiences in respective employment types, which are the variables of interest,6 !!" 
denotes a vector of other time-variant individual characteristics, such as current 
employment characteristics (employment type, occupation type, industry, and a dummy 
variable for the first year in that job, the last of which controls for firm-specific skills 
obsolescence caused by a job change) and location (urban/rural and province), !! 
represents individual fixed effects, controlling for time-invariant individual 
characteristics, !! denotes year fixed effects, and !!" is an error term with mean zero.   
 To identify the scarring effects of informal employment, a few potential sources 
of statistical endogeneity need to be carefully considered. Firstly, unobserved 
heterogeneity is an important issue to consider as unobservable characteristics of 
individuals, such as motivation and innate ability, can affect both past employment 
history and current earnings or current skills. For example, without controlling for such 
unobservable characteristics, estimates would be biased if unobserved lower motivation 
among some workers causes them to get stuck in an unfavorable job, receive lower 
earnings, and accumulate human capital at a lower rate. The inclusion of individual fixed 
effects accounts for time-invariant variables, both observed and unobserved. Fixed effects 
can also control for a possible endogenous selection into employment status, provided 
that such selection is due to time-invariant individual factors.  
Fixed effects can, however, lead to a concern that they soak up all the time-
invariant individual factors, including observed ones that may provide important insights 
into differential effects of labor scarring by different demographic subgroups. To 																																																								
6 Based on the conventional specification for the earnings equation used in the literature (Murphy and 
Welch, 1990), squared and cubic terms of experiences are also included in the estimations. 
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investigate this possibility, this paper conducts estimations using sub-samples by gender, 
age cohort, and education level. In addition, fixed effects still leave a potential problem 
of time-variant unobserved factors that may be correlated with both the outcomes and the 
covariates of interest. To control for time-variant factors, the analysis will include as 
many relevant variables as possible that are related to work and location characteristics 
that change over time.  
 Lastly, measurement errors can also lead to biased estimates. The main variables 
of interest, past work experience variables, are constructed based on retrospective work 
history. Therefore, it would be a problem if these variables were misreported due to recall 
errors. In each wave, a respondent is asked about his or her work history for up to eight 
years prior. The variables of interest are created by counting what type of employment 
the respondent held for each previous year and summing them over respective 
employment categories. As there are only several categories of employment, a respondent 
is less likely to make an error when reporting what kind of employment he or she had.7 
Nevertheless, the results should be interpreted with caution due to the potential recall 
errors. It should also be noted that the test scores used as outcome variables reflect only 
part of human capital, namely general skills rather than firm-specific skills. General skills 
are transferrable across different jobs and thus are important components of human 
capital, thereby they can still provide useful information about how general skills are 
affected by certain types of employment. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Scarring Effects on Earnings 
This subsection begins by assessing the presence of scarring effects of past employment 
on real hourly earnings from the current job.8 Table 3.5 presents estimations based on 																																																								
7 In IFLS-5, work history data are available back to 2007. Crosschecking this variable against the 2007 data 
available from IFLS-4, approximately 80% of workers in the sample report the same employment category 
for 2007. Given the possibility that some of the rest of workers may have switched their jobs in that year 
after the time of interview in IFLS-4, and that 2007 is the furthest year to recall for IFLS-5 and thus other 
years should have a smaller percentage of recall errors, the level of reliability appears to be quite high. 
8 The wage is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) obtained from the Indonesian Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Badan Pusat Statistik, and expressed in 2007 constant currency. 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) in columns (1) and (2). The difference in these columns is 
that the latter includes more control variables related to job characteristics, as indicated in 
the bottom of the columns, yet the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar. An 
additional year of past informal employment is associated with a 5–6% loss in current 
earnings, which suggests the presence of scarring effects of informal employment. 
Contrary to past informal employment, an additional year of past formal employment 
shows a positive return to current earnings.9 There is also an earnings premium for formal 
workers: workers who are currently employed in formal jobs earn 12–17% more than 
those currently in informal jobs.10 Conditional on the other regressors, male workers have 
38–43% higher earnings than their female counterparts.11 In terms of education variables, 
college degrees have the largest impact on earnings.   
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.5 report the results based on fixed effects 
estimations, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among individual workers. The 
time-invariant demographic variables drop out of these specifications.12 The earnings 
premium for formal workers is robust, and the magnitude is similar to the OLS estimation 
results. This finding suggests that formal jobs should be more attractive to workers if they 
are given choices, and supports earlier studies’ claims that the labor market is segmented. 
In contrast, the scarring effects of past informal employment become much smaller and 
are no longer significant when unobserved individual heterogeneity is controlled for. 
Therefore, it is important to take into account unobserved individual heterogeneity when 
estimating the influence of scarring effects. Although the coefficients in fixed effects 
estimations are smaller than the OLS coefficients, possibly due to higher measurement 
errors,13 it is worth noting that the signs of the coefficients for years of informal 
employment are unchanged and the magnitude is not negligible––1% loss in earnings per 																																																								
9 The difference between informal and formal employment experiences is significant at the 1% level, as 
shown in the p-values at the bottom row in Table 3.5. 
10 The percentage changes in earnings are computed according to the formula provided by Kennedy (1981) 
in this case where the independent variable is a dummy variable. 
11 The percentage changes in earnings are computed according to the formula provided by Kennedy (1981) 
in this case where the independent variable is a dummy variable. 
12	The education dummy variables are also dropped since they do not vary much over time within 
individuals. 
13 Therefore, the true effect may be between fixed effects and OLS estimates. 
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year, which can accumulate to a large loss over time. To provide a conservative (lower 
bound) estimate of the scarring effects, the subsequent estimations will use fixed effects 
in all specifications and include all the relevant job characteristic control variables, as in 
column (4). 
Table 3.6 shows the results of the fixed effects estimation, based on different sets 
of sub-samples. The disaggregation of the sample reveals that the formal sector earnings 
premium is observed only for male workers, the adult age group, and low-educated 
workers, as seen in columns (1), (4), and (5). An additional year of formal employment is 
statistically significant and likely to increase earnings by 9.6% for youths. Hence, 
accumulation of work experience in the formal sector appears to have large positive 
returns for youths. While the coefficients associated with years in informal employment 
are not significant across sub-samples, the signs of these coefficients are negative in four 
out of six cases. Although they are not precisely estimated, the magnitude of scarring 
effects is highest for female workers (6.8% per year) and highly educated workers (6.1% 
per year). 
The aggregate results discussed above, however, mask important differences in 
scarring effects by employment types. Table 3.7 presents estimates of scarring effects on 
earnings by different types of employment. Column (1) indicates that, in general, an 
additional year of working as a casual worker corresponds to an 8.8% loss in earnings. 
The sub-sample analysis shows that this scarring effect is apparent particularly for male 
workers, older workers, and low-educated workers. In addition, older workers experience 
a 59% drop in earnings associated with an additional year of working as an unpaid 
worker.14 
The finding in Table 3.7 that older workers tend to experience scarring effects of 
certain types of informal employment stands in contrast to the earlier literature that 
generally finds scarring effects for younger workers, but not for older workers. This can 
be in part due to the fact that prior studies largely depend on a broader definition of 
informal employment and aggregate sub-categories. By contrast, the result from this 																																																								
14 However, given a relatively large number of coefficients estimated and the statistical insignificance of 
unpaid workers for other sub-samples, it is possible that this coefficient turned out to be significant by a 
random chance and must be interpreted with caution. 
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disaggregated analysis highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the 
employment categories as different types of employment can influence a worker’s future 
prospects differently. 
The intuition behind the results in Table 3.7 is that casual workers and unpaid 
family workers, who are not often a major focus of other studies, may be marginalized in 
the labor market. They are less likely to accumulate skills consistently due to the nature 
of their work, and their employers may also lack an incentive to invest in their human 
capital.15 The adverse effect of such possible barriers can be detrimental at older ages, at 
which time other workers with similar characteristics have improved their productivity 
over many years. Furthermore, as discussed in Table 3.1, casual workers earn the lowest 
wage among the employment categories examined (except for unpaid workers). Future 
employers may regard these low wages in previous jobs as a signal of low productivity, 
which can also negatively affect subsequent wages. Although a casual job may be a 
stepping-stone to a better quality job, it appears that the longer a worker stays as a casual 
worker, the more penalties he or she will likely have in terms of future earnings.16 
In contrast to the scarring effects in the informal sector, an additional year of 
experience in the formal sector is linked with positive returns. The results in Table 3.7 
indicate that an additional year of being an employer who manages other permanent 
workers is likely to increase future earnings by 54% for women, 29% for older workers, 
and 25% for highly educated workers. This employment category accounts for only a 
small portion of the sample, but it may be inferred that an employer who manages 
permanent workers may accumulate human capital, such as management skills and 
entrepreneurial ability, over time. Hence, these jobs may foster the accumulation of 
human capital during employment spells, leading to higher earnings at older ages. In 
comparison, youth benefit from an additional year of formal sector experience, in 
																																																								
15 For example, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002) provide empirical evidence from Britain that 
temporary workers receive less work-related training than permanent workers, even after controlling for a 
number of other characteristics.   
16 In a related study, albeit it is in the context of an advanced country, Mooi-Reci and Wooden (2017) also 
find that Australian male workers of prime-age experience wage penalties from casual employment and the 
wage gap widens over time. 
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particular as government employees (24% increase per year) and as private sector 
employees (10% increase per year). 
In terms of sector earnings premiums, column (1) in Appendix Table B.7 suggests 
that in general, there is an earnings premium for government and private sector 
employees (24% and 16%, respectively, relative to casual workers, the omitted 
category).17 The analysis of sub-samples indicates that these formal sector earnings 
premiums apply particularly to male, older, and highly educated workers.  
 
3.5.2 Scarring Effects on Human Capital Measures 
This subsection examines scarring effects on human capital measures. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 
provide estimation results based on aggregate experience in formal and informal 
employment. In general, there do not seem to be significant scarring effects on either 
cognitive or math skills when aggregate measures of work experience are employed.18 
Interestingly, an additional year of both formal and informal employment corresponds to 
an increase in the math test score of 5 percentage points for youth. 
Table 3.10 provides estimation results on general cognitive tests using the 
disaggregated types of employment. Overall, general cognitive skills seem neither to 
depreciate nor to improve significantly as years of work experience increase, while an 
additional year of private sector employment is associated with an increase in general 
cognitive test scores of low-educated workers.19  
Table 3.11 presents estimation results on math tests. In contrast to the results for 
general cognitive skills, these results show that an additional year of employment as a 
casual worker and as an unpaid worker leads to a decrease in math test scores of 8 
percentage points and 27 percentage points, respectively, for female workers. This result 																																																								
17 The percentage changes in earnings are computed according to the formula provided by Kennedy (1981) 
in this case where the independent variables are dummy variables. 
18 However, for cognitive skills, the coefficients on years in informal employment are consistently negative 
except for female workers, and they are statistically significantly different from the coefficients on years in 
formal employment for the overall sample and low-educated workers at the 5 percent significance level, as 
shown at the bottom row of Table 3.8. 
19 However, given a relatively large number of coefficients estimated and the statistical insignificance of all 
other estimates, it is possible that this coefficient turned out to be significant by a random chance and must 
be interpreted with caution. 
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may reflect the fact that female workers in these jobs are engaged in less math intensive 
work. 20  Similarly, an additional year of casual employment corresponds to an 8 
percentage point loss in math scores for workers of older ages. Given a relatively large 
number of coefficients estimated, the results must be interpreted with caution. Yet, this 
finding may partly explain the result in the previous section that older casual workers 
tend to experience scarring effects on their earnings. Another significant finding is that 
numerical skills are likely to be positively affected by an additional year of experience as 
a private sector employee at younger ages.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper exploits the panel nature of the Indonesian Family Life Survey to assess the 
existence and magnitude of scarring effects due to informal employment on labor 
incomes and human capital, as measured by tests of cognitive skills. Fixed effects 
estimations show that, in general, there is little evidence of scarring effects due to 
informal employment on earnings. A closer look at different employment categories, 
however, shows that an additional year of work experience as casual workers and unpaid 
family workers are likely to decrease future earnings, especially for male workers and 
older workers. These findings point to the importance of considering differential effects 
of labor scarring by types of employment, gender, age cohort, and skill level, as effects 
seem to vary largely across different groups, although the results should be interpreted 
with caution given a larger number of estimates. 
While depreciation of human capital in the form of cognitive skills during spells 
of these types of informal employment can be one of the possible reasons leading to these 
negative effects on earnings, the paper finds limited evidence of scarring effects on direct 
measures of human capital. This suggests that an alternative mechanism, signaling, may 
play a major role in driving labor scarring. Informal workers can be stigmatized as less 
productive and may experience difficulties moving to formal jobs. Plausibly, the findings 
that the scarring effects of casual workers are present for male and adult workers, but not 																																																								
20 For example, none of female casual workers were in sales in 2014, and these casual workers were 
concentrated in agricultural work, service, and production line work. 
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for female and youth, can be of support to the stigma hypothesis. In general, young 
workers are more likely to move or change jobs, so casual work may be simply regarded 
as a stepping-stone to another job. Conversely, casual jobs at older ages may be viewed 
as a signal for low motivation and productivity. Similarly, male workers in casual jobs 
may experience such stigma in a country like Indonesia where males tend to be primary 
breadwinners, while females tend to stay at home. 
The estimations also find that there are formal sector earnings premiums, 
especially for government and private employees. Therefore, these jobs are preferable if 
workers can choose between formal and informal jobs, but the prevalence of informality 
in Indonesia implies that informal workers may often not have such a choice.  
Non-standard forms of employment, particularly casual workers, have been 
increasing in developing countries in Asia, and there is a rising concern over the effect of 
this phenomenon on development outcomes (International Labour Organization, 2017). 
The findings from this study have policy implications in that some types of workers with 
informal jobs may be experiencing implicit barriers that prevent them from moving to 
better jobs due to the structure of the labor market, and prevent them from earning higher 
incomes due to human capital depreciation and possible stigmatization. Hence, informal 
workers, especially those who are casual workers and unpaid workers, may need 
particular attention to better tap into the potential of these workers and improve their 
labor market prospects over the long run.  
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Table 3.1: The Distribution of Employment for Different Samples (%) 
Employment category 2007 
 All Male Female Youth Adult Low Edu. High Edu. 
Formal employment 69.9 67.2 76.7 78.5 67.6 56.8 84.8 
   Government sector employee  8.4 8.1 9.1 3.7 9.7 1.3 16.5 
   Private sector employee 51.1 50.4 52.7 70.8 45.8 43.3 59.9 
   Employer with permanent workers 1.8 2.1 0.9 1.2 1.9 1.4 2.3 
   Self-employed with temporary workers (non-agri.) 8.7 6.6 14.0 2.8 10.2 10.9 6.1 
Informal employment 30.1 32.8 23.3 21.5 32.4 43.2 15.2 
   Self-employed without other workers  15.4 14.5 17.9 8.9 17.2 20.9 9.3 
   Self-employed with temporary workers (agri.) 3.7 4.9 0.6 0.4 4.6 5.8 1.3 
   Casual workers 11.0 13.4 4.8 12.2 10.6 16.6 4.6 
		 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations 3,606 2,610 996 735 2,871 1,758 1,848 
 
 
  
  
  
 2014 
 All Male Female Youth Adult Low Edu. High Edu. 
Formal employment 71.8 68.7 79.1 80.2 70.1 60.4 84.9 
   Government sector employee  8.5 8.5 8.5 3.5 9.5 1.2 16.8 
   Private sector employee 49.0 48.9 49.3 66.8 45.4 43.1 55.8 
   Employer with permanent workers 2.7 2.9 2.3 1.9 2.9 2.5 2.9 
   Self-employed with temporary workers (non-agri.) 11.6 8.4 19.0 8.0 12.4 13.6 9.4 
Informal employment 28.2 31.3 20.9 19.8 29.9 39.6 15.1 
   Self-employed without other workers  14.6 14.3 15.4 9.6 15.7 19.1 9.5 
   Self-employed with temporary workers (agri.) 3.7 5.0 0.9 1.3 4.2 5.1 2.1 
   Casual workers 9.8 12.1 4.6 8.9 10.0 15.3 3.5 
		 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations 3,606 2,610 996 735 2,871 1,758 1,848 
          Note: Individual sample weights are applied.  
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Table 3.2: Transition in Employment Status between 2007 and 2014 (All Sample) 
                                                
                                              2014 
                                   
 2007 
Formal Informal     
Gov. Private Employer 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(nonag.) Self emp. 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(ag.) 
Casual 
worker 
Total 
(%) Obs. 
Fo
rm
al
 Government employee 83.8% 14.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.9% 0.9% 100% 321 
Private sector employee 2.4% 76.4% 1.4% 5.3% 6.4% 1.0% 7.0% 100% 1,871 
Employer 1.5% 7.6% 34.8% 28.8% 22.7% 4.5% 0.0% 100% 66 
Self emp. with temp. workers (nonag.) 0.0% 11.2% 7.1% 44.4% 26.4% 4.7% 6.1% 100% 295 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Self employment 1.4% 17.4% 3.4% 19.5% 46.4% 4.7% 7.2% 100% 558 
Self emp. with temp. workers (ag.) 0.0% 15.2% 3.6% 4.5% 17.9% 47.3% 11.6% 100% 112 
Casual worker 1.6% 46.0% 1.8% 6.3% 10.2% 1.6% 32.6% 100% 383 
  Observations 329 1,803 101 388 532 123 330 - 3,606 
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Table 3.3: Average Hourly Earnings by Employment Type (in Indonesian Rupiah, 2007 constant 
price) 
Employment category 2007 2014 
Formal employment 5516.8 8592.3 
       Government sector employee  9298.2 14904.6 
      Private sector employee 4946.3 7699.4 
      Employer with permanent workers 8904.7 14115.1 
      Self-employed with temporary workers (non-agri.) 4512.5 6455.5 
Informal employment 3675.5 5390.4 
      Self-employed without other workers  3553.2 5465.8 
      Self-employed with temporary workers (agri.) 5631.1 6926.1 
      Casual workers 3190.9 4694.0 
		 		
Note: Individual sample weights are applied. As of December 31, 2014, the exchange rate 
was 1 USD = 12,440 IDR. 	
 
  
	 44 
Table 3.4: Workers’ Characteristics 
Variable Mean SD 
Highest level of education completed:   
        Primary school (=1 if the highest level completed is primary) 0.39 0.49 
        Secondary school (=1 if the highest level completed is secondary) 0.38 0.49 
        College or higher (=1 if the highest level completed is college or higher) 0.11 0.32 
Urban (=1 if in urban area) 0.69 0.46 
Real hourly earnings (in natural logs) 8.37 0.94 
Current employment industry (=1 if yes):   
        Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting  0.11 0.31 
        Mining, quarrying 0.01 0.11 
        Manufacturing 0.21 0.40 
        Electricity, gas, water 0.01 0.08 
        Construction 0.08 0.28 
        Wholesale, retail, restaurants, hotels 0.26 0.44 
        Transportation, storage, communications 0.05 0.21 
        Finance, insurance, real estate, business services 0.03 0.17 
        Social services 0.24 0.42 
        Other 0.01 0.09 
Current occupation (=1 if yes):   
        Professional/Technical  0.05 0.22 
        Administrative/Managerial 0.01 0.07 
        Clerical 0.08 0.28 
        Sales 0.21 0.40 
        Service 0.17 0.37 
        Agriculture/forestry 0.11 0.31 
        Production line workers 0.10 0.31 
        Semi-skilled production workers 0.06 0.24 
        Blue-collar production workers 0.21 0.40 
First year in the current job (=1 if yes) 0.13 0.34 
Cognitive tests:   
        General cognitive test (% correct) 68.7 30.5 
        Math test (% correct) 36.6 30.5 
	 	
	Note: There are 7,212 observations in the sample. For cognitive tests, the sample consists of 
4,988 observations. 
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Table 3.5: Scarring Effects of Past Employment on Current Earnings 
Dependent variable: 
Real hourly earnings (in natural logs) 
OLS Fixed Effects 
[1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Years in formal employment 0.038 ** 0.033    *     0.020 
 
0.023 
 
 
(0.018)  (0.018)   (0.025)  (0.025)  
                    
Years in informal employment -0.061 *** -0.054 ***   -0.011 
 
-0.010 
 
 
(0.019)  (0.018)   (0.031)   (0.031)  
             
Currently in formal employment 0.154 *** 0.110 ***     0.138   *** 0.131 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.037)  (0.037)   (0.050)   (0.050)  
                     
First year in the current job -0.175 *** -0.193 *** **   -0.141 *** -0.148 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.028) (0.027) 
 
 (0.034)  (0.034) 
   
 
   
Urban 0.015 
 
0.006        0.017   
 
0.016   
        (=1 if in urban areas, 0 if in rural areas) (0.025)
 
(0.025)   (0.041)  (0.041)  
              
Male 0.355 *** 0.323 *** 
          (=1 if male, 0 if female) (0.027)  (0.027)   
 
 
 
 
              
Highest level of education: primary 0.114 *** 0.097 *** 
           (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.040)  (0.040)   
 
 
 
 
 
            
Highest level of education: secondary 0.484 *** 0.456 *** 
          (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.041)  (0.041)   
 
 
 
 
              
Highest level of education: college or higher 1.031 *** 0.948 *** 
          (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.049)  (0.051)   
 
 
 
 
                
Province dummy variables Yes 
 
Yes        Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry dummy variables No  Yes         No  Yes 
 Occupation dummy variables No   Yes         No    Yes  
Observations 7,212   7,212    7,212   7,212  
R-squared 0.32  0.34     0.22  0.23 
Test Years in formal employment = Years in 
informal employment (p-value) 0.000  0.001   0.397  0.371 
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual 
level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Quadratic and cubic terms of cumulative years of formal and informal employment, a year 
dummy, and a constant are included in all estimations, but not reported. 
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Table 3.6: Scarring Effects of Past Employment on Current Earnings by Different Sample Groups 
(Fixed Effects Estimations) 
Dependent variable: 
Real hourly earnings (in natural 
logs) 
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4]       [5]   [6] 
Male Female Youth Adult      Low     Edu. 
High 
Edu. 
Years in formal employment 0.020      0.035      0.096 ** 0.006  0.007  0.043 
 
 
(0.029)  (0.049)    (0.048)   (0.030)   (0.037)  (0.033)   
                           
Years in informal employment -0.005  -0.068    0.008   -0.009  0.024  -0.061 
 
 
(0.034)  (0.076)    (0.067)   (0.035)   (0.040)  (0.049)  
                    
Currently in formal employment 0.138 ***   0.066      0.163   0.139 *** 0.166 *** 0.089 
        (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.055)  (0.124)    (0.109)   (0.059)    (0.068)  (0.078)  
            
Observations 5,220    1,992       1,470   5,742  3,516  3,696  
R-squared 0.25    0.19       0.41  0.20  0.21  0.29 
Test Yrs. in formal emp. = Yrs.            
   in informal emp. (p-value) 0.535  0.250    0.249  0.744  0.740  0.051 
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Individual and year fixed effects, quadratic and cubic terms of cumulative years of formal 
employment and informal employment, industry dummy variables, occupation dummy variables, a 
first year job dummy, province dummy variables, an urban dummy, and a constant are included in 
all estimations, but not reported. 
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Table 3.7: Scarring Effects of Past Employment on Earnings by Disaggregated Employment Types (Fixed Effects Estimations) 
Dependent variable: 
Real hourly earnings (in natural 
logs) 
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]       [6]   [7] 
All  Male Female Youth Adult      Low      Edu. 
High 
Edu. 
Years as government sector 0.007 
 
-0.021      0.047      0.235 * -0.006  0.048  -0.010 
        employee (0.046)  (0.055)  (0.080)    (0.127)   (0.051)   (0.135)  (0.052)   
                               
Years as private sector 0.015  0.023  -0.010     0.098 ** -0.017  -0.010  0.041 
       employee (0.025) (0.029)  (0.050)   (0.046)  (0.030)  (0.038)  (0.031) 
            
Years as employer 0.258 *** 0.190 *  0.536    ***     0.048  0.294 *** 0.245 * 0.253 ** 
 (0.090) (0.101)  (0.181)    (0.258)  (0.097)  (0.130)  (0.124) 
            
Years as self-employed with         0.013 0.059  -0.054     0.166  0.022  0.064  -0.030 
       temp. workers (non-agri.) (0.047) (0.057)  (0.085)   (0.143)  (0.051)  (0.065)  (0.068) 
            
Years as self-employed without         0.046 0.038   0.061      0.011 0.042  0.122 ** -0.087 
       other workers (0.039) (0.043)  (0.100)    (0.098)  (0.044)  (0.054)  (0.060) 
           
Years as self-employed with         0.066 0.052  0.263       0.564 0.031  0.072  0.056 
       temp. workers (agri.) (0.120) (0.127)  (0.348)    (0.737)  (0.125)  (0.140)  (0.193) 
           
Years as casual worker -0.088 ** -0.095 ** -0.052     -0.003 -0.086 ** -0.091 * -0.035 
 (0.037) (0.040)  (0.113)    (0.080)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.058) 
           
Years as unpaid family worker -0.148 -0.081  -0.518    -0.136  -0.590 ** -0.160  -0.409 
 (0.173) (0.206)  (0.407)    (0.268)  (0.300)  (0.259)  (0.264) 
              
Observations 7,212   5,220    1,992        1,470  5,742  3,516  3,696  
R-squared 0.24  0.26      0.24        0.44  0.22  0.22  0.32 
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Individual and year fixed effects, quadratic and cubic terms of cumulative years of experience in respective 
employment types, current employment type dummy variables, industry dummy variables, occupation 
dummy variables, a first year job dummy, province dummy variables, an urban dummy, and a constant are 
included in all estimations, but not reported. 
4. For the current employment type dummy variables, casual workers are the reference group. 
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Table 3.8: Scarring Effects of Past Employment on Human Capital Measures (Fixed Effects Estimations) 
Dependent variable: 
Cognitive test scores (% 
correct) 
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]       [6]   [7] 
All  Male Female Youth Adult      Low      Edu. 
High 
Edu. 
Years in formal employment 1.308 
 
1.335    2.641    1.447 
 
1.540  3.469 * -0.012 
 
 
(1.031)  (1.297)  (1.851)   (1.492)  (1.611)   (1.842)  (1.184)   
                              
Years in informal employment -1.964 
 
-1.727 0.781   -1.048   -2.502  -2.247  -1.308 
 
 
(1.297)  (1.536)  (3.122)   (1.768)   (1.983)   (1.782)  (1.824)  
             
Observations 4,988   3,584    1,404       1,423   3,565  2,359  2,629  
R-squared 0.06  0.07    0.12       0.09  0.10  0.10  0.08 
Test Yrs. in formal emp. = Yrs.              
   in informal emp. (p-value) 0.043  0.099  0.614    0.266  0.113  0.020  0.553 
 
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Individual and year fixed effects, quadratic and cubic terms of cumulative years of formal employment and 
informal employment, current employment type dummy variables, industry dummy variables, occupation 
dummy variables, a first year job dummy, province dummy variables, an urban dummy, and a constant are 
included in all estimations, but not reported. 
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Table 3.9: Scarring Effects of Past Employment on Human Capital Measures (Fixed Effects Estimations) 
 
Dependent variable: 
Math test scores (% correct) 
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]       [6]   [7] 
All  Male Female Youth Adult      Low      Edu. 
High 
Edu. 
Years in formal employment 0.327 
 
1.939    -2.477     5.244 *** -2.635  1.400  -0.068 
 
 
(1.435)  (1.717)  (2.721)   (1.890)   (2.365)   (2.092)  (1.984)   
                              
Years in informal employment 0.762 
 
2.390 -1.332     4.748 **  -3.096  0.712  0.394 
 
 
(1.722)  (1.974)  (3.656)   (2.342)   (2.650)   (2.227)  (2.786)  
             
Observations 4,988   3,584    1,404       1,423   3,565  2,359  2,629  
R-squared 0.05  0.07    0.12       0.10  0.10  0.08  0.07  
Test Yrs. in formal emp. = Yrs.               
   in informal emp. (p-value) 0.843  0.854  0.812     0.865  0.896  0.812  0.891  
              
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Individual and year fixed effects, quadratic and cubic terms of cumulative years of formal employment 
and informal employment, current employment type dummy variables, industry dummy variables, 
occupation dummy variables, a first year job dummy, province dummy variables, an urban dummy, and a 
constant are included in all estimations, but not reported. 
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Table 3.10: Scarring Effects of Past Employment on General Cognitive Skills by Disaggregated Employment Types (Fixed Effects Estimations) 
Dependent variable: 
Cognitive test scores (% 
correct) 
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]       [6]   [7] 
All  Male Female Youth Adult      Low      Edu. 
High 
Edu. 
Years as government sector -0.663 
 
-1.675     3.262  -4.040 
 
0.743  -4.700  -1.922 
        employee (2.147)  (2.601)  (4.129)   (4.225)  (2.943)   (11.21)  (2.200)   
                               
Years as private sector 1.168 1.335   2.179   1.829  -0.054  4.321  ** -1.280 
       employee (1.115) (1.409)  (1.952)  (1.531)  (1.842)  (1.947)  (1.308) 
            
Years as employer -2.695 -2.406  7.956    -10.87  2.587  1.250  1.884  
 (3.949) (4.462)  (11.47)  (8.660)  (5.013)  (6.258)  (6.413) 
            
Years as self-employed with         0.322 -0.154  0.698  1.633  0.985  -0.347  -0.443 
       temp. workers (non-agri.) (1.812) (2.403)  (2.689)  (2.930)  (2.402)  (2.551)  (2.581) 
            
Years as self-employed without         -1.075 -0.438  0.838  -1.686  -0.826  1.490  -3.631 
       other workers (1.672) (1.983)  (2.724)  (2.487)  (2.344)  (2.289)  (2.328) 
           
Years as self-employed with         3.674 4.047  10.418  12.920  1.235  6.306  4.360 
       temp. workers (agri.) (4.381) (4.668)  (9.162)  (23.57)  (4.800)  (5.220)  (13.19) 
           
Years as casual worker -0.934 -0.608   -5.360 0.647  -0.911  -2.737 2.276 
 (1.761) (1.925)  (5.931)  (2.472)  (2.697)  (2.265)  (2.766) 
           
Years as unpaid family worker 4.486 5.723  3.821  1.241  2.995  -3.393  9.107 
 (6.851) (8.422)  (10.56)  (6.447)  (16.27)  (11.82)  (8.914) 
            
              
Observations 4,988   3,584    1,404       1,423   3,565  2,359  2,629  
R-squared 0.08  0.09     0.19       0.11  0.13  0.14  0.12 
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Individual and year fixed effects, quadratic and cubic terms of cumulative years of experience in respective 
employment types, current employment type dummy variables, industry dummy variables, occupation 
dummy variables, a first year job dummy, province dummy variables, an urban dummy, and a constant are 
included in all estimations, but not reported. 
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Table 3.11: Scarring Effects of Past Employment on Numerical Skills by Disaggregated Employment Types (Fixed Effects Estimations) 
Dependent variable: 
Math test scores (% correct) 
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]       [6]   [7] 
All  Male Female Youth Adult      Low      Edu. 
High 
Edu. 
Years as government sector -0.572 
 
-0.128    -1.094   -4.573 
 
1.675  -9.078  -2.258 
        employee (3.848)  (4.893)  (6.565)   (6.760)  (5.183)   (16.47)  (4.431)   
                               
Years as private sector -0.333 0.753  -2.107      4.679 ** -4.348 * 1.088  -0.105 
       employee (1.476) (1.721)  (2.920) (2.008)  (2.429)  (2.183)  (2.019) 
            
Years as employer 12.448 ** 16.197 *** -0.107      15.672  9.025  16.658  ** 10.622  
 (5.226) (5.684)  (29.47) (10.919)  (7.582)  (7.929)  (8.776) 
            
Years as self-employed with         -1.207 2.321  -6.583    5.604  -4.122  2.871  -4.591 
       temp. workers (non-agri.) (3.206) (4.357)  (4.484) (5.879)  (4.040)  (4.329)  (5.353) 
            
Years as self-employed without         2.034 2.967  6.030    2.235  2.594  5.936  * -1.205 
       other workers (2.377) (2.714)  (4.717) (3.556)  (3.182)  (3.320)  (3.397) 
           
Years as self-employed with         7.018 11.216 * 6.475     7.409  2.949  18.081      *** -45.61 ** 
       temp. workers (agri.) (5.691) (5.994)  (17.29) (25.84)  (6.697)  (5.805)  (19.45) 
           
Years as casual worker -0.249 1.108   -8.180  *     9.304  *** -8.091 ** -1.434 -0.444 
 (2.266) (2.466)  (4.358)   (3.327)  (3.462)  (2.714)  (4.166) 
           
Years as unpaid family worker -6.958 -0.130  -27.22  **   -9.299  3.718  -35.34 *** 2.938 
 (10.58) (13.18)  (12.59)    (10.26)  (20.70)  (12.74)  (12.93) 
            
              
Observations 4,988   3,584    1,404       1,423   3,565  2,359  2,629  
R-squared 0.06  0.09     0.18        0.12  0.13  0.12  0.10 
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Individual and year fixed effects, quadratic and cubic terms of cumulative years of experience in respective 
employment types, current employment type dummy variables, industry dummy variables, occupation 
dummy variables, a first year job dummy, province dummy variables, an urban dummy, and a constant are 
included in all estimations, but not reported. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Informality and the Labor Market Effects of Mass 
Migration: Evidence from Syrian Refugees in Turkey 1,2 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The magnitude of forced migration around the world has reached an unprecedented scale in 
recent years: by 2016, more than 65 million people had been forcibly displaced due to war, 
conflict or generalized violence, and 22.5 million of them had migrated to another country 
as refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Given the sheer magnitude and unexpected nature of these 
large inflows of refugees, they are likely to have substantial impacts on the host countries. 
These impacts are especially relevant in developing countries, which are often characterized 
by scarce resources, poor labor market conditions, and high informality. Given that the vast 
majority of refugees, 84%, are hosted by developing countries (UNHCR, 2017), 
understanding how sudden waves of forced immigration affect hosting economies is an 
important question in economic development. 
This paper studies the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey and uses detailed 
microdata to quantify the labor market effects of a major immigration shock on a developing 
hosting country. Since its start in 2011, the Syrian war has generated the largest flow of 																																																								
1 This chapter is co-authored with Norman Loayza (World Bank) and Gabriel Ulyssea (University of 
Oxford). 
2 For insightful comments and suggestions, we thank Ximena Del Carpio, Aysenur Acar, and seminar 
participants at Oxford and the 7th Turkey Labor Market Network Meeting. This research paper has been 
made possible in part thanks to funding from the World Bank’s Research Support Budget (RSB), under the 
project “Informality, Migration, and Growth,” and through a grant from the Jobs Umbrella Trust Fund. The 
latter is supported by the Department for International Development/UK AID, the Austrian Development 
Agency, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and the Governments of Norway 
and Germany. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of 
the authors; they do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its executive directors, or the 
governments they represent. 
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war-displaced people since World War II. Turkey has received over 2.8 million Syrian 
refugees as of the end of 2016, making it the largest host country in the world (UNHCR, 
2017). Besides its considerable magnitude, this massive inflow of refugees has two 
distinguishing features. First, refugees were not granted work permits until 2016 and had high 
employment rates, therefore their arrival essentially represents a well-defined informal labor 
supply shock. Second, these inflows were heterogeneous across regions, which provides 
spatial variation in the magnitude of the shock and allows us to understand better the direct 
and indirect mechanisms through which this shock may have affected the labor markets across 
the country. 
We develop a model where individuals of different skill levels self-select into their 
preferred region of residence based on their (idiosyncratic) comparative advantage and 
origin-destination specific mobility costs. This generates a labor supply structure similar to 
the general-equilibrium Roy models developed by Bryan and Morten (2017) and Hsieh et 
al. (2016). Additionally, in each region heterogeneous firms can exploit two margins of 
informality (Ulyssea, 2018): (i) the extensive margin, i.e. whether to register their 
business; and (ii) the intensive margin, which refers to the decision of firms that are 
formally registered to hire their workers with or without a formal contract. Potential 
entrepreneurs self-select into the formal or informal sectors based on their expected 
productivity, so that more productive, larger firms (in expectation) self-select into the 
formal sector. Regions differ in terms of their initial (pre-refugee shock) endowment of 
skilled labor and in terms of the distribution of potential firm entrants. The latter may 
capture, among other things, structural differences in technology and access to capital 
across regions. Finally, we also include a national minimum wage, which might be binding 
for low skill workers in a given region, depending on local labor market conditions. Since 
we allow for regions to be heterogeneous in their capacity to enforce the laws and 
regulations, this introduces yet another source of heterogeneity across regions. 
We estimate the model using a two-step minimum distance method akin to the 
Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). In the first step, we use macro data to directly 
calibrate some of the aggregate parameters in the model, and micro data to directly estimate 
the parameters of the distribution of heterogeneous individual characteristics (which is 
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assumed to follow a Frechet distribution) and the migration costs between regions. In the 
second step, we take as given the parameters determined in the first stage and use the 
structural model to generate simulated micro data sets of formal and informal firms and 
workers. The final calibrated vector of parameters is the one that minimizes the distance 
between the moments computed from simulated and real micro data. 
The estimated model is used to perform counterfactual analyses to assess the 
equilibrium labor market effects of the inflows of refugees, the distribution of effects across 
regions, and the mechanisms through which the shock plays out. We focus on key labor 
market outcomes, particularly the effect on the size of the informal sector and the skill 
premium, paying attention to differences across regions. In brief, we find that although 
the inflow of Syrian refugees induces an increase in informality among low skill workers 
(as expected), it also generates both a reduction in informality among high skill workers 
and a rise in the skill premium. Moreover, while the impact on informality varies across 
regions (with those with larger numbers of refugees experiencing larger effects), the shock 
spreads to all regions in the host country due to regional migration of native workers. 
To date, most of the empirical studies have focused primarily on international 
migration to developed countries. In general, the impact of voluntary international migration 
on local labor markets is found to be minimal (see, for example, Pischke and Velling, 1997, 
for Germany; Carrasco et al., 2008, for Spain). The main argument for such negligible 
impact is that capital inflows accompanying the inflow of immigrants lessen the negative 
impact of immigration on natives’ employment outcomes (Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Ruist 
and Bigsten, 2013). In contrast, internal migration tends to lower the employment prospects of 
local residents (Boustan et al., 2010; Strobl and Valfort, 2013; Berker, 2011). 
In the cases of involuntary migration such as refugees, the empirical findings on the 
labor market impact on host communities are mixed (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013). For 
example, the influential paper by Card (1990) on the Mariel Boatlift does not find any 
significant effect of Cuban refugees on the wages and unemployment rates of less-skilled 
local workers in Miami. In contrast, Calderon-Mejia and Ibanez (2016) estimate the impact 
of forced migrants in Colombia using instrumental variables and find that the wages and 
employment of unskilled workers in host communities are negatively affected. These 
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effects of massive forced migration can also vary according to the types of native workers in 
receiving economies. Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) study the impact of refugee inflows from 
Burundi and Rwanda on native workers in host regions in Tanzania. They find that the 
refugee inflows have a positive impact on agricultural producers as they benefit from lower 
wages of these immigrants, while the inflows bring a negative effect on agricultural 
workers because of increased competition. 
Closely related to our study, Tumen (2016) and Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) 
examine the economic impact of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Treating the forced 
immigration as exogenous shocks and using a difference-in-differences approach, Tumen 
(2016) finds that Syrian refugees decrease informal employment among Turkish natives by 
2.3 percentage points and increase formal employment by 0.5 percentage points. The paper 
also examines the effect on the wages of Turkish natives and finds it to be insignificant 
for both formal and informal workers. Similar results are obtained in Del Carpio and 
Wagner (2015)’s study. They use an instrumental variable strategy and show that refugee 
flows lead to significant losses of natives’ employment in the informal sector, especially 
for women and less educated workers. On the contrary, consistent with Tumen (2016)’s 
finding, Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) find that formal employment of Turkish natives 
increases. Disaggregating the sample by gender and skill level, they reveal that this 
positive effect in the formal sector is found only for men with medium-level of education, 
suggesting occupational upgrading. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by developing a new theoretical model to 
assess the effects of regional dynamics on informality and accounting for refugee shocks in the 
model. We seek to provide a framework to understand the effects of such shocks that can 
also be applied to other countries. Gaining a deeper insight into this issue is of particular 
relevance to both the international community and receiving countries, helping them design 
policies to mitigate conflicts and concerns posed by the recent massive migration of 
refugees. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the most 
salient stylized facts regarding Syrian migration and labor market conditions in regions in 
Turkey, along with a description of related data sources. The following section then presents 
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a structural spatial model of formal and informal firms and workers. After discussing the 
estimation methodology, the paper conducts a set of counterfactual exercises to assess the 
impact of the refugee migration shock on the Turkish labor market. The paper concludes with 
a discussion of the main findings and suggestions for further work. 
 
4.2 Data and Facts 
4.2.1 Data 
We use two different data sources to characterize workers and firms in Turkey: (i) Survey 
of Income and Living Conditions (SILC); and (ii) Address Based Population Registration 
System (ABPRS). These data sets are compiled from the Turkish Statistical Institute. The 
SILC is a cross-sectional household survey conducted every year, from which we obtain 
information on workers’ education and employment. The ABPRS provides regional 
statistics on in-migration. We use the 2010 data for our baseline economy, which is the 
pre-period for the massive migration of Syrian refugees. To complement our main data 
sources, we use data on refugees collected by the Directorate General of Migration 
Management in Turkey. Throughout the paper, we use the 12 regions at NUTS-1 level in 
Turkey (the first administrative level) as the definition of an economic region.3 We define 
as informal workers those who are not registered with the social security system. In Turkey, 
every worker is required to be registered with the social security administration and, 
therefore, those who do not comply are defined as informal. High skill workers are defined 
as those who have at least completed high school. We include workers of age 15 and over 
in our sample. 
 
4.2.2 Syrian Refugees in Turkey 
Syrian refugees began fleeing to Turkey in early 2011. As Figure 4.1 shows, the number 
of Syrian refugees in Turkey has increased dramatically over the years, from 260 in May 																																																								
3 NUTS is an abbreviation of Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques (in French), which means 
the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, and is a geographical nomenclature used in the European 
Union subdividing the country into regions at three different levels (NUTS 1, 2 and 3 respectively, moving 
from larger to smaller territorial units). 
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2011 to over 2.5 million in October 2016. The refugee inflows surged especially in 2014 
and continued to grow since then. For our analysis, we use 2014 as the year when the 
labor supply shock hit the country. Figure 4.2 presents the number of Syrian refugees in 
each region as of November 2014. Refugees are unevenly spread across regions, highly 
concentrated in the Southeast Anatolia region, which borders with Syria. There were 
715,794 Syrian refugees residing in the Southeast Anatolia region, which is equal to 
approximately 8.7% of the Turkish population in that region. The Mediterranean region 
(which contains the province of Hatay on the Turkish-Syrian border) and Istanbul region 
also hosted a relatively large number of refugees, amounting to 4.1% and 2.0% of the 
Turkish population, respectively. In other regions, the ratio of Syrian refugees to Turkish 
population reached no more than 1%. Syrian refugees did not receive work permits 
during the period considered in this study as the Turkish government started granting 
them only in January 2016. Therefore, these refugees essentially entered the informal 
labor market, if employed, and engaged mostly in labor-intensive, low-wage jobs in 
sectors such as construction and agriculture (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; İçduygu, 
2016). 
 
4.2.3 Labor Market and Informality in Turkey 
We now turn to discussing the labor market of Turkish natives. The Turkish labor market 
has been characterized by a relatively large share of informality. In our sample, the share 
of informal labor is estimated at 36% in 2010 and 28% in 2014 at the national level. 
Among the potential factors contributing to high informality is the country’s rigid labor 
regulation. For instance, Turkey’s strictness of employment protection legislation and the 
minimum wage standard (as a ratio of the median wage) are the highest in the OECD 
countries (World Bank, 2014). 
While informal labor is still widespread, it has been on a declining trend in recent 
years. Figure 4.3 presents the share of informal workers among Turkish natives by region 
in 2010 (before the mass immigration flow) and 2014 (during the massive refugees’ 
arrival). The figure shows that the rate of informal employment decreased in all regions 
over the period studied. It should be, however, noted that the progress in decreasing its 
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level varies considerably across regions. For example, the share of informal workers 
significantly dropped from 42.7% in 2010 to 23.0% in 2014 in the Central Anatolia 
region, whereas that of the East Black Sea region decreased only slightly from 51.7% to 
47.4%. 
In general, eastern part of the country (Southeast Anatolia, Central East Anatolia, 
Northeast Anatolia, and East Black Sea), which is largely rural, tends to have a higher 
share of informal workers. In contrast, the Istanbul region, which is predominantly urban, 
has the lowest share of informal workers. 
A closer examination reveals that most informal workers are employed in small-size 
firms. Table 4.1.a presents the employment distribution of formal and informal workers by 
firm size in 2010. The values on the left show that 41.2% of formal workers are employed 
in relatively large firms with 50 or more employees. In contrast, only 2.4% of informal 
workers work for this largest size category, and the majority of them (88.1%) work in in 
small firms with 10 or fewer employees. The values on the right suggest that in small 
firms with 10 or fewer employees, 60.5% of workers are employed informally, whereas in 
large firms with 50 or more employees, only 3.2% are informal workers. Therefore, 
informality is primarily concentrated in small-size firms. While the share of informal 
workers declined in 2014, a similar composition is again observed, as shown in Table 
4.1.b. 
Another characteristic of informal employment is that low-skilled workers tend to be 
employed in informal jobs. Figure 4.4 illustrates this point by showing that regions with a 
lower concentration of high-skilled workers tend to have a higher rate of informality. For 
instance, the Southeast Anatolia region had the lowest ratio of high-skilled workers 
(29.1%) and the highest ratio of informality (60.1%) in 2010. The figure suggests that low 
skills or low level of education may drive workers to the informal sector, and these low-
skilled workers may be most affected by the massive inflows of Syrian refugees. 
 
4.3 Model 
The model economy is composed by a discrete set of N regions. Individual’s place of birth is 
denoted by “o” (origin) and the place where they live and work is denoted by “d” 
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(destination), which can be their birth place (i.e., no migration). Each region produces a 
differentiated good, which is used as an input in the production of the aggregate consumption 
good through a Cobb-Douglas function: 
! = !!!!!!!!                                                               4.1   
where Yd  is total output of the differentiated good of region d, and !! = 1! . The price of 
the final good is normalized to 1. 
 
4.3.1 Firms 
Firms produce a homogeneous good using labor as their only input, and markets are 
competitive within regions. There are two types of workers in this economy, low and high 
skill, which are aggregated at the firm level using a CES technology: ℓ! = (!!!!! + 1− !! !!!)!!  
where l1 denotes high skill workers and l0 low skill workers; s = i, f indexes informal and 
formal sectors; ηs denotes the share parameter in each sector; and ρ is a common elasticity 
of substitution parameter. Firms’ production function is standard, given by y (θ, ℓ!) = θq (ℓ!), 
where θ indexes firms’ productivity and q (·) is assumed to be increasing, concave, and 
twice continuously differentiable. 
Firms can exploit two margins of informality (Ulyssea, 2018): (i) the extensive 
margin; that is, the firm decides whether to formalize its business; and (ii) the intensive 
margin; that is, registered firms decide the extent to which they formalize their workers. 
Sector membership is defined by the extensive margin and the (in)formal sector is 
comprised by (un)registered firms. Thus, potential entrants first decide whether to enter the 
formal or informal sectors (or not to operate at all); and, if entry occurs, formal firms have 
the option to hire formal or informal workers or both (the intensive margin).4 
Firms face the same problem across regions, so we omit the region subscript for 
notational simplicity. If a firm decides to operate in the informal sector, it evades all taxes 																																																								
4 By definition, informal firms cannot hire formal workers, as their entire business is at the margin of the 
relevant laws and regulations. Thus, informal firms’ employees are necessarily informal. 
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and regulations, which amount to the payroll and revenue taxes and the minimum wage. 
Even though informal firms do not comply with taxes and regulations, they face an expected 
cost that takes the form of a labor distortion denoted by τi (ℓ!), which is increasing in 
firm’s composite employment ℓ!  (see Ulyssea, 2018). This formulation captures the fact 
that larger firms are more visible to the government, and therefore they are more likely to be 
detected. When detected, informal firms must pay fines or bribes, and this additional expected 
cost is reflected in the term τi. Informal firms’ profit functions are given by: !,!!! ,!!! = max!! ,!! !"# ℓ! − !!(ℓ!)(!!! !! + !!! !!)} !                   (4.2) 
where ℓ!  is the composite employment given by the CES aggregation of low and high 
skills workers, and τi(·) > 1, τi(·)’ > 0. 
When operating in the formal sector, firms must pay payroll and revenue taxes, as 
well as to comply with minimum wage regulations. The minimum wage is national and it 
may or may not be binding in a given region, which will depend on local labor market 
conditions. Even though formal incumbents must comply with taxes and regulations, they 
can hire informal workers to avoid the costs implied by the labor legislation. However, 
there are costs associated with hiring informal workers as well, which are analogous to the 
costs faced by informal firms: there is an increasing and convex expected cost to hire 
informal workers, which can differ across workers’ skill levels: τfk (lk), τ’fk, τ”fk  > 0, where 
k = 0, 1. The rationale for this specification is to account for the fact that formal firms may 
face different costs and benefits to formalize low and high skill workers, which are 
captured by different expected costs. 
Conditional on skill, formal and informal workers are homogeneous and perform 
the same tasks within the firm. Therefore, at the margin firms only hire the cheaper factor 
(formal or informal labor). The marginal cost of hiring informal workers, τ’fk(·)wk, is 
strictly increasing and the marginal cost of hiring formal workers, (1 + τw) wk, is constant, 
where τw refers to the payroll tax. Hence, there is a unique threshold that equates marginal 
costs, denoted by l˜k, above which the firm starts to hire only formal labor, for each skill 
level k. Since the cost functions can differ across skill levels, formal firms might have 
different thresholds for hiring low and high skill formal workers. The functions τfk(·) are 
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parameterized and  estimated,  so  the  data  will  determine  whether  the  thresholds  l˜1 and  l˜0 
are different.  If, for example, l˜1 < l˜0, then formal firms can be in one of three possible 
situations:  (i) hire all of its workers informally, if !!∗  ≤ l˜ k , k = 0, 1; (ii) hire all of its low skill 
workers informally but some high skill workers formally, if !!∗ > l˜1, !!∗  ≤ l˜0; and (iii) hire some 
formal  workers  of  both  skill  levels,  if  !!∗  > l˜ k, k = 0, 1. The profit maximization for 
formal firms can thus be written as follows: !,!!! ,!!! = max!! ,!! (1 − !!)!"# ℓ! − !(!! , !!)} !                   (4.3) 
and ! !! , !!
= !!! !! !!! + !!! !! !!! ,  for  !! ≤ !!                                                                                    !!! !! !!! + 1 +  !! !!! !! − !! +  !!! !! !!! ,  for !! > !! , !! ≤ !!                         !!"(!!!,! !!)!!! + 1 +  !! !!! !! − !! + max ! ,!!! !! − !! ,  for  !! > !!  
where  τy  is  the  revenue  tax  and  w¯ denotes  the  minimum  wage.5 Firms in both sectors must 
pay a per-period, fixed cost of operation, which is denoted by c¯s, s = i, f. This is a standard 
formulation in the literature and can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of operating in 
sector s. The profit function net of this fixed cost of operation is denoted by πs(θ, w) = 
Πs(θ,w) − c¯s. 
 
4.3.2 Entry 
There is a mass of potential firm entrants in each region, denoted by Mn, n = 1, ..., N. 
Potential entrants observe only a pre-entry productivity parameter, ν, which can be 
interpreted as a noisy signal of their effective productivity and has a distribution Gd that 
varies across regions. Regional differences in G capture, among other things, structural 
differences in technology, public infrastructure, and access to capital across regions. G is 																																																								
5 Note that the minimum wage may or not be binding for low skill workers employed formally, while we 
assume that it is never binding for high skill workers. 
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assumed to be absolutely continuous with support (0, ∞), with finite moments, and the 
same for all firms and independent across periods (i.e., ν is i.i.d.). Hence, the mass of 
entrants in one period does not affect the composition of potential entrants in the following 
period. To enter either sector, firms must pay a fixed cost (denominated in units of output) 
that is assumed to be higher in the formal sector: Ef > Ei. 
After entry occurs, firms draw their actual productivity from the conditional c.d.f. 
Fd (θ|ν), which can also vary across regions but is the same in both sectors and independent 
across firms. Fd (θ|ν) is assumed to be continuous in θ and ν, and strictly decreasing in ν. 
Hence, a higher ν implies a higher probability of a good productivity draw after entry 
occurs. Once firms draw their productivity θ, it remains constant forever and firms face an 
exogenous exit probability denoted by κs, s = i, f. If firms are surprised with a low 
productivity draw θ < θ¯ , where πs(θ¯ , w) = 0, they decide to exit immediately without 
producing. Aggregate prices, including wages, remain constant in steady state equilibria; and 
since firms’ productivity also remains constant, a firm’s value function assumes a very 
simple form: !! !,! = !"# 0, !! !,!!!  
where for notational simplicity we assume that the discount rate is normalized to one. 
The expected value of entry for a firm with pre-entry signal ν is: !!! !,! = !! !,! !"(!|!) ,        ! = !, !                             (4.4) 
Firms enter the formal sector if !!! !,! − !! ≥ max !!! !,! − !! , 0} and they choose 
the informal sector if !!! !,! − !! ≥ max !!! !,! − !! , 0}. When entry in both sectors 
is positive, the following entry-conditions hold: 
                                             !!! !!,! = !!  !!! !! ,! = !!! !! ,! + (!! − !!) 
where !!  is the pre-entry productivity of the last firm to enter sector s = i, f. 
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4.3.3 Consumers/Workers 
The economy has an overall mass of Lk workers of skill level k = 0, 1, which is fixed. Each 
region is endowed with a mass of workers of low and high skill, L0,o and L1,o, such that !!,! =  !!! , for k = 0, 1. Workers born in a given region o can choose where to 
live/work, including staying in their region of origin. The utility of individual j, from 
region o and living/working in d is determined by three components: (i) her consumption 
of the final good, cj; (ii) a taste-shifter parameter, !!"! , which we allow to differ across skill 
levels; and (iii) the migration cost associated to moving from o to d, zod: !!"# = !!"! c!!!"                                                                   (4.5) 
                                                          
where the shock !!"!  is i.i.d. and drawn from a multinomial Frechet distribution 
!! !!,… , !! = exp !!!!!!!!!  
where we allow the shape parameter (!!) to vary across skill levels and a higher !! 
corresponds to a smaller dispersion of !. 
 When deciding where to live/work, individuals do not know ex ante if, 
conditional on moving to a given region d, they will get a formal or an informal job. 
Since workers are homogeneous conditional on skill, we assume that they are randomly 
allocated between formal and informal jobs, and therefore the probability of finding a 
formal/informal job is given by the share of formal/informal jobs in that given region and 
skill level. We assume that individuals are risk neutral and therefore they look at the 
expected wage when deciding where to migrate to: !!"! = !!"!!"! + (1− !!")!!"! , where !!" is the share of informal jobs of type k in region d. Conditional on skill, formal and 
informal workers should receive the same wage unless the minimum wage binds. Since it 
never binds for skilled workers, formal and informal wages are the same and we have that !!!! = !!!! = !!!! . For low skill workers the minimum wage can be binding in some 
regions and thus !!!! = !! and !!!! < !!. 
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 We assume that individuals cannot save nor borrow and therefore they consume 
all of their earnings. Hence, we can write the indirect (expected) utility of moving to d by 
individual j, born in o and with skill level s as !!"#! = !!"! !!"!!!"  
Labor supply in region d is given by the share of workers from other regions who 
decide to migrate to d plus the share of its own workers who decide to stay in d. Conditional 
on their place of birth o, individuals choose their place of residence solving max!∈!|! !!"! . 
Using standard results from the Frechet distribution, the share of workers born in o who 
decide to live and work in d is given by !!|!! = !!"#!!!!"#!!!!!!                                                      (4.6) 
where !!"# = !!"! /!!". Labor supply in d is thus given by !!,!!! = !!|!!!!!! !!,!                                             (4.7) 
 
4.3.4 Equilibrium  
An equilibrium is defined by (1) stationarity conditions and (2) market-clearing conditions. We 
focus on stationary equilibria, where all aggregate variables remain constant. Hence, the size 
of the formal and informal sectors must remain constant over time in every region, which 
implies the following condition: !! = 1 − !!!(!!)!! !!                                                 (4.8) 
                                                     
where µs denotes the mass of active firms in sector s. This condition simply states that the 
mass of successful entrants in both sectors must be equal to the mass of incumbents that 
exit. In addition, to guarantee the stationarity of all aggregate variables, it must satisfy that 
all preference, technological, and policy parameters remain the same. 
For the market-clearing conditions, the labor market in every region must clear, 
which implies that firms’ demand for each type of labor, k, in every region d must be equal 
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to the endogenous supply, !!,!!! . Additionally, the equilibrium is characterized by the zero 
profit cutoff (ZPC) condition in both sectors, θ ≥ !!where πs(θs, w) = 0. Finally, the goods 
market must clear. Since products are differentiated by region, then the condition should 
be that demand for each (regional) product should be equal to its supply. The supply is 
given by the sum of production in the formal and informal sectors. The demand is equal 
to total wage income (at the national level) times the share spent in each differentiated 
product: Y λd.6 Putting these conditions together, it must follow that in every region, we 
have: !!!! ! ℓ! + !!!! ! ℓ! = !!!                                   (4.9) 
 
4.4 Estimation and Calibration 
The model is calibrated using a method of minimum distance that is very close to 
Simulated Method of Moments. The calibration proceeds in two steps. In the first step, 
we use macro data to directly calibrate some of the aggregate parameters in the model, 
and we use the statutory values of the revenue and payroll taxes. Also, we use micro data 
to directly estimate the parameters of the Frechet distribution and the migration costs 
between regions. 
In the second step, we rely on the method of minimum distance to obtain the values 
for the remaining parameters. The intuition for the calibration is straight-forward. We use 
the structural model to generate simulated data sets of formal and informal firms and 
workers, which make decisions regarding production and location. For each simulated data 
set, we compute a set of moments that are also computed from real data. The calibrated 
vector of parameters is the one that minimizes the distance between the estimated and 
simulated vector of moments. The inverse of the diagonal matrix that contains the 
variances of the estimated moments in the main diagonal is used as the weighting matrix. 
 
																																																								
6 Note that this result is derived from the Cobb-Douglas function: Yλd = pdYd, where pd is the price of the 
differentiated product of region d. 	
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4.4.1 The Frechet and Migration Cost Parameters 
Labor supply in region d is given by the share of workers from other regions who decide 
to migrate to d plus the share of its own workers who decide to stay in d. As discussed 
above, the share of workers born in o who decide to live and work in d is given by !!|!! = !!"#!!!!"#!!!!!!  
where !!" = !!"! /!!" . 
 In order to identify the parameters of interest, we make the following standard 
assumptions: (i) symmetry in mobility costs, zod = zdo; and (ii) no mobility costs for stayers, 
zoo = 1. With these normalizations, we can identify the ζk from the retention rates: !!|!!!!|!! = !!"
! !!!!!"! !!! = !!"
!!!"! !!                                        (4.10) 
where ! ≡ (!!!! !!"! /!!")!!. 
 Remember that !!"! = !!"!!"! + (1− !!")!!"! , where !!"  is the share of 
informal jobs of type k in region d, is the expected wage in region d. In the data, this 
corresponds to the average wage for skill level k in region d, including formal and informal 
employees. Hence, we observe 
!!|!!!!|!!  and !!"!!!"!  in the data and can compute the ζk from the 
equation (4.10) above. Log-Linearizing it:  !" !!|!!!!|!! = !!!" !!"!!!"!  
If we assume that these variables are measured with error, we can obtain the ζk from a 
regression of the ratio of retention rates on the relative wages. We proceed in an analogous 
way in order to estimate the mobility costs, zod: !!|!!!!|!! = !!"
! !!!!!"! /!!" !!! = !!" !!"
!!!"! !!                                 (4.11) 
and taking logs, one obtains 
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!" !!|!!!!|!! = !!!" !!"!!!"! + !!!" !!" 
where again we can obtain all mobility costs by allowing measurement error in the 
relationship above and estimating it using OLS. 
 
4.4.2 Second Step: Minimum Distance Calibration 
In order to proceed with the calibration, it is necessary to complete the model’s 
parameterization by imposing functional forms to the objects that were left unspecified. 
Starting with the productivity distribution among potential entrants, we assume it follows a 
Pareto-Lognormal distribution. This three-parameter distribution was first introduced by 
Colombi (1990), and can be obtained as the product between a Pareto random variable with 
shape parameter ξ and a log-normal with mean µ and variance σ2. Assuming that µ = 0, we 
have that θ ∼ P LN (0, σ2, ξ). This distribution has a log-normal body with a Pareto right tail, 
which provides a very good approximation for firm size distributions (e.g. Luttmer, 2007; 
Ulyssea, 2018). 
The cost functions faced by informal firms and by formal firms that hire informal 
workers take a very simple functional form (as in Ulyssea, 2018): !! ℓ! = 1 + ℓ!!! , where 
bi  >  0 and  !!" !! = 1 + !!!!" , k = 0, 1. We assume that the per-period, fixed costs of 
operation are a function of the equilibrium wage for low-skilled workers, which makes 
the exit margin more meaningful since it now responds to market conditions. The fixed 
costs are determined as follows: !! = !!!!, 0 < !!< 1. As for the production function, 
we assume a span-of-control formulation: y (θ, ℓ!) = θℓ!! , where α < 1 and ℓ!  is the CES 
aggregation of low and high skill labor in sector s = i, f. 
We use the following set of moments for each of the 12 regions at NUTS-1 level 
in Turkey: 
1. Overall share of informal workers (12 moments) 
2. Share of high skill workers (12 moments) 
3. Share of informal workers among high and low skill workers (2×12 moments) 
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4. Formal employment distribution in four size categories7 (4 × 12 moments) 
5. Informal employment distribution in four size categories (4 × 12 moments) 
 
4.4.3 Results and Model Fit 
Even though we impose symmetry of mobility costs, there are 66 mobility cost parameters. 
Hence, to summarize the results, Figure 4.5 shows the density plots of the estimated 
mobility cost parameters for low and high skill workers. As the figure shows, mobility 
costs are substantially higher for low skill workers, which is intuitive, as these workers are 
more likely to face, for example, credit constraints that prevent them from moving. 
Table 4.2 contains the values for all the remaining parameters in the model. As the 
table shows, formal sector’s share parameter for high skill workers (ηf in the CES 
production function) is quite high in all regions, ranging from 0.65 (in Istanbul and 
Southeast Anatolia) to 0.73 (in Central East Anatolia). The opposite is true for informal 
sector’s production function, which ranges from 0.2 (in Central East Anatolia) to 0.29 (in 
East Anatolia and West Anatolia). This result is expected, as the formal sector employs 
more high skill workers than the informal one. Interestingly, the estimated entry costs are 
everywhere higher in the formal than in the informal sector but this differential also varies 
greatly across regions. If we interpret this difference between formal and informal entry 
costs as the regulatory and bureaucratic costs, as well as infrastructure and information 
barriers to open a formal business, then the results reveal a great degree of heterogeneity 
between regions. Consistently, the lowest differential between formal and informal entry 
costs is observed in the most developed region – Istanbul, only a 12% difference – which 
under this interpretation would suggest the lowest bureaucratic cost to open a formal business. 
The largest differences are observed in West Black Sea and Northeast Anatolia, which 
indicates the presence of high costs to open a formal business. 
As for the fit of the model, Figure 4.6 and Table 4.3 show that the model re- 
produces well the different moments in all regions. Figure 4.6 compares the share of 
informal workers, one of the moments, computed from the real data and the model. 
																																																								
7 Four size categories are: (1) 10 or less; (2) 11-19; (3) 20-49; and (4) 50 or more. 
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Similarly, Table 4.3 shows the employment distribution for selected regions and confirms 
that the computed moments from the real data and the model are similar to each other. 
 
4.5 Counterfactual Simulations 
In order to assess the different impacts of the inflow of Syrian refugees, we calibrate the 
model to the Turkish economy in the baseline year of 2010, before the migration waves 
took place. We then use the structural model to simulate the impacts of receiving the 
inflow of Syrian migrants. For that, we make three assumptions about the inflow of 
migrants: (i) it represented a positive shock only to the supply of low skill workers; (ii) the 
refugees were restricted to informal labor; and (iii) once the refugees settle in one region, they 
stay there. These assumptions are motivated by the actual context in which the arrival of 
the Syrian refugees occurred. In particular, these assumptions derive from the fact that the 
refugees were not granted work permits during our period of analysis, which implies that 
regardless of the skill level these refugees had, they had access to only low skill, informal 
jobs. 
As for the size of the shock, we parameterize it to correspond to the actual shock.  
We  use the number of refugees who are aged 15 or above and settled  in a given region as 
of November 2014 and compute the corresponding share with respect to the population of 
low skill individuals aged 15 or above in the receiving region. Once the shock hits the 
different regions, we compute the new equilibrium in the labor market of each region 
accounting for both demand and supply responses, which include the decisions to migrate or 
stay in the same region. Table 4.4 shows the results, where “before” corresponds to the 
actual outcomes before the immigration of Syrian refugees started and “after” corresponds 
to the counterfactual simulation after the shock hit. 
As one could expect, the immigration increased the share of informal employees 
among low skill workers in the region that received the largest inflow of migrants (Southeast 
Anatolia). However, the increase in the share of informal workers among low-skilled 
workers was much lower than the size of the supply shock that the inflow of refugees 
represented. The refugee shock (in ratio of native low-skill population) in Southeast 
Anatolia was 12.8%, but the share of low skill informal workers increased by only 5 
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percentage point (7.9% increase from the baseline). In part, this is caused by the migration of 
native low skill workers to other regions in response to the decline in low skill wages 
observed in Southeast Anatolia. Indeed, when we perform the simulations in partial 
equilibrium – not allowing workers to migrate – the effects on informality are substantially 
higher (results not reported but available upon request). These results are confirmed in Table 
4.5, which shows the size of the shock in each region (first column), as well as the variation 
in the stock of low and high skill workers in each region (all in percentage terms). As the 
table shows, the refugee shock propagates to all regions, as all regions observe changes in 
the stocks of low and high skill workers. 
Another interesting aspect of the results is that they show that, if anything, high 
skill workers are positively affected by the inflow of refugees. The skill premium remains 
roughly constant or increases in all regions, and more substantially so in Southeast Anatolia 
(the region with the largest inflow). Similarly, the informality share among high skill workers 
decreases or remains constant in all regions, which again indicates that these workers 
actually benefited from the inflow of refugees. The greater availability of low skill workers 
does not substantially affect the employment distribution across firm size, except again for 
Southeast Anatolia. In this region, since informal labor is now cheaper, informal firms can 
grow more and the size distribution becomes slightly more concentrated in mid-sized firms, 
11–19 and 20–49 employees. The opposite happens in the formal sector, where small 
firms (with less than 10 employees) increase their participation. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Large waves of migrants can have important economic impacts on receiving countries, 
especially on their labor markets. With 21 million people forcibly displaced as refugees 
worldwide, this represents a major challenge to potential host countries, the majority of 
which have poor and developing economies. In this paper, we study the case of Syrian 
refugees in Turkey to help understand the labor market effects of a major immigration 
shock. 
The paper first presents a structural model, featuring regional labor markets, formal 
and informal firms and workers, labor and revenues taxes, exogenous productivity shocks, 
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and workers with different skill levels. The model generates a steady state equilibrium, 
after firms decide whether to formalize and whether to hire formal workers, workers 
decide where to live and work through regional migration, and prices and wages adjust to 
clear labor and output markets. The model is then calibrated by selecting parameters that 
best match the model to actual pre-shock conditions in Turkey in 2010. Finally, the 
calibrated model is used to conduct a counterfactual analysis, which compares the pre-
shock conditions to the simulated effect of a large labor supply shock, corresponding to 
the inflow of Syrian refugees. In broad terms, this allows us to gauge the impact of mass 
immigration on the labor market of a host economy. 
The first set of results is obtained from the model’s calibration itself. In general 
qualitative terms, Turkish regions are similar with each other. Notably, in all regions the 
formal sector employs a large share of high skill workers (about two-thirds), much larger 
than the share of high skill workers employed by the informal sector (about one-quarter). 
This fact is consistent with the calibrated result that, in all regions, the relative cost of 
formalizing a low skill worker is larger than that of formalizing a high skill worker. 
Quantitatively, though, there are large differences across regions in the relative costs of 
formalizing high and low skill workers. Likewise, the calibration indicates that the formal 
sector faces a higher entry cost than the informal sector does in all regions. However, the 
value of the calibrated entry cost differential between the formal and informal sector 
varies substantially across regions, with larger differentials in less developed regions. 
The second, most important, set of results is obtained from the counterfactual 
analysis. This uses the calibrated model to simulate the effect of a large labor supply 
shock on key outcomes of the labor market. In this way, we gauge the impact of the 
massive inflow of Syrian refugees on the Turkish economy. The first result is possibly 
unsurprising: it shows that the regions with larger inflows of refugees, notably Southeast 
Anatolia, have experienced bigger increases in the share of informal employment among 
low skill workers. The second result is less obvious: the magnitude of the increase in 
informality for low skill workers has been much smaller than the size of the actual supply 
shock. Although mobility costs for low skill workers tend to be high, this result implies that 
the refugee shock has caused some of the native low skill workers to migrate to other regions. 
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Therefore, all regions are affected directly or indirectly by the refugee shock, 
experiencing changes in the supply of low and high skill workers. The third result is 
equally interesting: high skill workers throughout Turkey appear to have benefitted from 
Syrian immigration, as their skill premium increases in most regions. Moreover, the share 
of informal employment among high skill workers has also decreased after the shock, 
especially in Southeast Anatolia. 
From a public policy perspective, the results have four clear policy implications. The 
first is that refugees should be allowed to work legally, especially if there is the dual goal of 
integrating them into society and supporting the formalization of firms and workers. Turkey 
has made significant progress in this regard by granting work permits to refugees starting in 
January 2016. The second is that the larger skill premium induced by the inflow of 
refugees should be capitalized by improving the opportunities and lowering the costs of 
obtaining and upgrading technical and professional skills, both for future entrants and 
current participants of the labor market. The third is that labor mobility is an effective 
buffer mitigating large shocks and, therefore, should be encouraged by lowering 
transportation and residential settlement costs both within and across regions. The fourth 
is that the formalization costs and benefits should be reviewed and reformed not only 
nationally but also at the regional and local levels, where substantial differences remain. 
Regarding future research, two issues stand out. The first is that we have very 
limited information regarding the labor characteristics of the Syrian refugees. Once detailed 
labor force survey information becomes available, the analysis can be better refined 
regarding the type and magnitude of the shock that the inflow of refugees represents, as well 
as its likely consequences on the host labor market. The second is related to the effects of the 
policy change that allowed Syrian refugees to work legally by granting them work permits 
in January 2016. This is likely to have consequences on Syrian migration throughout 
Turkey, sectoral impacts as Syrian refugees may leave agriculture and primary activities, 
and pressures to integrate and formalize new businesses. 
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Figure 4.1: Number of Syrian Refugees over Time 
 
Sources: AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency); 
UNHCR & AFAD (as cited in Kirisci, 2014); Directorate General of Migration Management. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of Syrian Refugees by Region as of November 2014 
 
Source: Directorate General of Migration Management. 
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Figure 4.3: Informal Workers by Region (% of Total Employment) 
Source: SILC 2010 and 2014. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Share of Informal Workers vs. Share of High-Skilled Workers by Region 
 
Source: SILC 2010 and 2014. 
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Figure 4.5: Mobility Costs for Low and High Skill Workers (as a Share of the Minimum Wage) 
 
 
                                     
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2201 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Share of Informal Workers in Each Region: Model vs. Data 
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Table 4.1.a: Employment Distribution of Formal and Informal Workers by Firm Size, 2010 
Firm Size (# of workers) Formal Workers (%) Informal Workers (%) 
10 or less 32.4 / 39.5 88.1 / 60.5 
11–19 10.8 / 75.3 6.3 / 24. 7 
20–49 15.6 / 89.5 3.2 / 10.5 
50+ 41.2 / 96.8 2.4 / 3.2 
   
 
Note: The first numbers refer to employment distribution by firm size within formal or informal 
workers so that they add up to 100 column-wise. The second numbers refer to distribution of 
formal and informal workers within each size category so that they add up to 100 row-wise. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.b: Employment Distribution of Formal and Informal Workers by Firm Size, 2014 
Firm Size (# of workers) Formal Workers (%) Informal Workers (%) 
10 or less 32.2 / 48.2 88.9 / 51.8 
11–19 10.2 / 81.8 5.9 / 18.2 
20–49 16.3 / 93.7 2.8 / 6.3 
50+ 41.3 / 97.8 2.4 / 2.2 
   
 
Note: The first numbers refer to employment distribution by firm size within formal or informal 
workers so that they add up to 100 column-wise. The second numbers refer to distribution of 
formal and informal workers within each size category so that they add up to 100 row-wise 
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Table 4.2: Parameter Values 
 
Parameter Description 
Values 
Istanbul 
West 
Marmara Aegean 
East 
Marmara 
West 
Anatolia 
Medite-
rranean !! Payroll Tax 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 !! Revenue Tax 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 !! Formal Sector’s Exit Probability 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 !! Informal Sector’s Exit Probability 0.305 0.23 0.27 0.259 0.3 0.245 !! Per-period Fixed Cost (Formal) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 !! Per-period Fixed Cost (Informal) 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 ! Cobb-Douglas Coefficient 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 !! Extensive Mg. Cost 9 8 8 8 8 8 !!! Intensive Mg. Cost (High Skill) 1.1 1.2 1 1.3 1 2.2 !!! Intensive Mg. Cost (Low Skill) 3.1 7 8.7 6.2 8 9.5 ! Pareto’s Shape Parameter 5.7 4.9 4.9 4 4.2 4.8 ! Post-Entry Shock Variance 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.57 !! Formal Sector’s Entry Cost * 2800 2500 2500 3000 3000 3000 !! Informal Sector’s Entry Cost * 2500 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 ! CES Elasticity ! = !!!! 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 !! High Skill Share Parameter (Formal) 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.68 !! High Skill Share Parameter (Informal) 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.26 
* Values in Turkish Lira. 
Note: The tax rates are set to their statutory values, and all other parameters are calibrated. 
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Table 4.2: Parameter Values (Continued) 
 
Parameter Description 
Values 
Central 
Anatolia 
West 
Black Sea 
East 
Black Sea 
N.E. 
Anatolia 
C.E. 
Anatolia 
S.E. 
Anatolia !! Payroll Tax 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 !! Revenue Tax 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 !! Formal Sector’s Exit Probability 0.1293 0.1293 0.1293 0.1293 0.1293 0.1293 !! Informal Sector’s Exit Probability 0.36 0.36 0.365 0.3 0.35 0.3 !! Per-period Fixed Cost (Formal) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 !! Per-period Fixed Cost (Informal) 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.3 ! Cobb-Douglas Coefficient 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 !! Extensive Mg. Cost 8.5 3.1 5 5 9 8 !!! Intensive Mg. Cost (High Skill) 2 1.9 1.5 1 2.62 3.5 !!! Intensive Mg. Cost (Low Skill) 4 3 7.5 9 11 9 ! Pareto’s Shape Parameter 4.3 3.78 4.8 5.7 5.7 5.9 ! Post-Entry Shock Variance 0.45 0.4 0.48 0.6 0.61 0.56 !! Formal Sector’s Entry Cost * 2700 3500 3500 3500 2800 3000 !! Informal Sector’s Entry Cost * 2000 2000 2300 2000 2500 2500 ! CES Elasticity ! = !!!! 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 !! High Skill Share Parameter (Formal) 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.65 !! High Skill Share Parameter (Informal) 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.2 0.24 
* Values in Turkish Lira. 
Note: The tax rates are set to their statutory values, and all other parameters are calibrated. 
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Table 4.3: Formal and Informal Employment Distribution: Data vs. Model 
 
 Istanbul W. Marmara Aegean E. Marmara 
 Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 
Informal Employment         
  10 or less 0.635 0.888 0.774 0.850 0.818 0.864 0.769 0.897 
  11–19 0.169 0.093 0.140 0.114 0.107 0.087 0.108 0.067 
  20–49 0.131 0.016 0.008 0.027 0.051 0.035 0.066 0.024 
  50+ 0.066 0.003 0.079 0.009 0.025 0.013 0.058 0.011 
Formal Employment         
  10 or less 0.220 0.300 0.201 0.177 0.230 0.225 0.195 0.179 
  11–19 0.126 0.133 0.108 0.116 0.127 0.130 0.120 0.105 
  20–49 0.199 0.200 0.162 0.201 0.178 0.206 0.139 0.167 
  50+ 0.456 0.366 0.529 0.507 0.465 0.439 0.546 0.549 
         
 W. Anatolia Mediterranean C. Anatolia W. Black Sea 
 Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 
Informal Employment         
  10 or less 0.816 0.890 0.753 0.859 0.866 0.894 0.838 0.978 
  11–19 0.104 0.067 0.162 0.101 0.065 0.093 0.046 0.011 
  20–49 0.043 0.030 0.068 0.029 0.029 0.010 0.032 0.007 
  50+ 0.038 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.040 0.003 0.084 0.003 
Formal Employment         
  10 or less 0.215 0.228 0.223 0.161 0.263 0.212 0.252 0.248 
  11–19 0.125 0.119 0.105 0.128 0.145 0.128 0.122 0.125 
  20–49 0.161 0.183 0.173 0.220 0.176 0.198 0.191 0.175 
  50+ 0.499 0.470 0.499 0.492 0.416 0.462 0.435 0.452 
         
 E. Black Sea N.E. Anatolia C.E. Anatolia S.E. Anatolia 
 Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model 
Informal Employment         
  10 or less 0.835 0.885 0.874 0.907 0.657 0.719 0.753 0.768 
  11–19 0.124 0.063 0.045 0.057 0.116 0.219 0.150 0.189 
  20–49 0.029 0.038 0.055 0.025 0.095 0.056 0.052 0.037 
  50+ 0.012 0.013 0.027 0.010 0.132 0.006 0.045 0.007 
Formal Employment         
  10 or less 0.283 0.314 0.217 0.253 0.204 0.152 0.218 0.131 
  11–19 0.162 0.156 0.172 0.135 0.120 0.115 0.125 0.123 
  20–49 0.225 0.209 0.241 0.214 0.194 0.215 0.196 0.225 
  50+ 0.330 0.321 0.370 0.397 0.482 0.518 0.461 0.521 
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Table 4.4: Impacts of Syrian Migration 
 
 Istanbul W. Marmara Aegean E. Marmara W. Anatolia Mediterranean 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
% Informal Workers (High Skill) 0.105 0.106 0.079 0.079 0.072 0.072 0.038 0.038 0.067 0.067 0.137 0.131 
% Informal Workers (Low Skill) 0.362 0.363 0.391 0.389 0.370 0.369 0.170 0.169 0.353 0.352 0.442 0.441 
% Informal Workers (All) 0.251 0.254 0.253 0.253 0.230 0.230 0.102 0.102 0.208 0.209 0.299 0.298 
% High Skill Workers 0.432 0.425 0.443 0.441 0.471 0.469 0.517 0.514 0.508 0.504 0.470 0.460 
Informal Employment             
  10 or less 0.887 0.884 0.850 0.849 0.863 0.862 0.896 0.895 0.889 0.889 0.860 0.851 
  11–19 0.097 0.101 0.112 0.113 0.088 0.089 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.099 0.107 
  20–49 0.013 0.013 0.029 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.024 0.024 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.031 
  50+ 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 
Formal Employment             
  10 or less 0.300 0.296 0.191 0.190 0.231 0.229 0.095 0.095 0.236 0.233 0.163 0.161 
  11–19 0.133 0.133 0.130 0.130 0.126 0.126 0.058 0.057 0.122 0.122 0.126 0.125 
  20–49 0.205 0.202 0.219 0.218 0.212 0.213 0.089 0.089 0.190 0.190 0.225 0.221 
  50+ 0.362 0.369 0.460 0.461 0.431 0.432 0.758 0.759 0.453 0.455 0.486 0.493 
Skill Premium 1.914 1.946 1.942 1.951 2.143 2.156 1.771 1.786 1.960 1.979 1.948 1.997 
             
 
  
		
81 
Table 4.4: Impacts of Syrian Migration (Continued) 
 
 Istanbul W. Marmara Aegean E. Marmara W. Anatolia Mediterranean 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
% Informal Workers (High Skill) 0.107 0.107 0.122 0.121 0.103 0.103 0.068 0.068 0.111 0.110 0.172 0.134 
% Informal Workers (Low Skill) 0.515 0.519 0.361 0.361 0.393 0.392 0.485 0.484 0.638 0.645 0.635 0.685 
% Informal Workers (All) 0.331 0.333 0.254 0.254 0.232 0.231 0.258 0.258 0.434 0.440 0.484 0.513 
% High Skill Workers 0.452 0.451 0.447 0.446 0.557 0.556 0.543 0.542 0.386 0.383 0.327 0.311 
Informal Employment             
  10 or less 0.899 0.898 0.978 0.978 0.886 0.886 0.904 0.904 0.717 0.713 0.769 0.726 
  11–19 0.089 0.090 0.012 0.012 0.063 0.063 0.060 0.060 0.220 0.223 0.188 0.222 
  20–49 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.039 0.039 0.026 0.026 0.057 0.059 0.036 0.045 
  50+ 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 
Formal Employment             
  10 or less 0.206 0.204 0.263 0.262 0.322 0.321 0.251 0.251 0.146 0.146 0.131 0.147 
  11–19 0.127 0.127 0.133 0.134 0.160 0.161 0.133 0.133 0.110 0.110 0.119 0.109 
  20–49 0.192 0.193 0.179 0.179 0.217 0.217 0.225 0.224 0.213 0.214 0.234 0.222 
  50+ 0.475 0.476 0.425 0.425 0.301 0.301 0.391 0.392 0.530 0.530 0.516 0.522 
Skill Premium 2.099 2.110 1.930 1.939 1.773 1.779 1.947 1.953 2.500 2.520 2.319 2.466 
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Table 4.5: Size of the Refugee Shock and Changes in Low and High Skill Labor Supply 
 
Region 
Refugee Shock 
(in %) 
Δ Low Skill 
Workers (in %) 
Δ High Skill 
Workers (in %) 
Istanbul 3.48 3.09 0.09 
West Marmara 0.05 0.89 0.29 
Aegean 0.21 1.14 0.17 
East Marmara 0.69 1.23 -0.07 
West Anatolia 1.52 1.60 0.03 
Mediterranean 5.48 4.43 0.28 
Central Anatolia 0.37 0.45 0.07 
West Black Sea 0.05 0.59 0.00 
East Black Sea 0.03 0.64 0.24 
Northeast Anatolia 0.01 0.49 0.19 
Central East Anatolia 0.41 0.69 -0.52 
Southeast Anatolia 12.75 6.53 -0.98 
Note: The refugee shock is defined as in the text: the share of total refugees received by a given 
region up to 2014 over the population of low skill individuals aged 15 and above. The change in the stock 
of low skill workers (second column) and high skill workers (third column) is computed as the variation 
between the baseline economy and the new equilibrium after the arrival of refugees. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation studied three issues in developing countries, related to human capital, 
labor, and migration. First, Chapter 2 examined differential impacts of remittances by the 
gender of children in Nigeria. The study found that in general, an increase in the amount 
of remittances is likely to increase household expenditure on education and that the 
positive impact on school enrollment is larger for girls than for boys. The results provide 
further evidence of the importance of facilitating the flow of remittances through policies 
such as reductions in transaction costs. 
Second, Chapter 3 analyzed how past employment experiences affect workers’ 
future labor market outcomes in Indonesia. The study found that workers who participate 
in certain types of informal employment, namely casual work and unpaid work, 
experience scarring effects on future wages. These negative effects were found especially 
for male workers and older workers. The analysis further indicated that the primary 
source of this scarring appears to be stigma attached to these types of employment, rather 
than depreciation of human capital. The findings suggest that these workers may need 
particular attention to improve their labor market prospects. 
Lastly, Chapter 4 built and estimated a structural model to study the impact of the 
inflow of Syrian refugees on the labor market in Turkey. The counterfactual analysis 
showed that while the regions with the larger inflows of refugees experience bigger 
increases in the share of informal employment among low skill workers, the magnitudes 
of these increases were much smaller than the actual shocks due to out-migration of 
native workers. The results suggest that the labor supply shock affected all regions 
directly and indirectly, but labor mobility can be an effective buffer mitigating large 
shocks. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: First-stage Regression Results for Table 2.3 on the Amount of Remittances 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Amount of remittances 
       (in the past 12 months)    
Households with children of: 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Number of school-age children 0.165 
 
0.169        0.191 
        in household (0.100)  (0.105)  (0.102)  
           
Household size -0.060 
 
-0.069      -0.086 * 
        (0.042)  (0.046)   (0.048)   
           
Household head's schooling years -0.044 ** -0.044 **   -0.082 ** 
  (0.019)  (0.018)   (0.034)   
           
Asset index 0.130 * 0.162 *   ** *   0.066 
         (0.076)  (0.077)   (0.124)  
           
Islam -0.122 
 
-0.041       -0.238 
        (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.303)  (0.325)   (0.380)  
           
Urban 0.282 
 
0.324     0.783 * 
       (=1 if living in urban, 0 if in rural) (0.332)  (0.324)   (0.466)   
           
Migrant location: Urban Nigeria 5.332 *** 5.415             ***     5.788 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.379)  (0.419)   (0.440)   
      
Migrant location: Rural Nigeria 1.354 ** 1.230   **      2.666 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.532)  (0.560)   (0.786)   
      
Migrant location: Europe 8.862 *** 9.029   ***     8.822 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.613)  (0.615)   (0.895)   
      
Migrant location: U.S. or Canada 8.713 *** 8.859   ***     8.638 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.865)  (0.864)   (1.297)   
           
Migrant location: Other Africa 6.082 *** 6.370   ***    5.365 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.957)  (0.961)   (1.172)   
           
Migrant location: Other regions -0.217 
 
-1.461               -0.716 
        (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (1.372)  (1.250)   (1.718)  
 
         
Constant 0.442 
 
0.427      0.678 
   (0.299)  (0.297)   (0.448)  
             
Observations 1365   1186        735   
R-squared 0.516   0.530     0.548   
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 65.0  61.2      44.7  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses.  
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. The excluded IVs 
include migrants’ location dummies. Sample weights are used. 
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Table A.2: Impact of Remittances on Educational Expenditure (IV estimation with the gender 
composition variable) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Expenditure on education 
  
Households with children of: 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.102 ** 0.095 **    0.071  
       (in the past 12 months) (0.045) (0.048) 
 
(0.062)  
   
 
  
Share of boys in household -0.001 0.001 
 
-0.002  
 (0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.007)  
             
Observations 1365   1186        735   
F-statistic (Instruments)           63.7  59.5      44.3  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Expenditure on education and remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. IVs include migrants’ location dummies. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
Table A.3: Impact of Remittances on Educational Expenditure (IV estimation with the gender 
composition variable) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Expenditure on education 
  
Households with children of: 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.182 ** 0.108 **    0.106  
       (in the past 12 months) (0.076) (0.051) 
 
(0.085)  
   
 
  
Amount of remittances * Share of boys -0.002 -0.000 
 
-0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001)  
   
 
  
Share of boys in household 0.002 0.005 
 
0.004  
 (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.005)  
             
Observations 1365   1186        735   
F-statistic (Remittance)           39.0  43.4     34.8  
F-statistic (Boy share*Remittance)           46.6  49.5     25.3  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Expenditure on education and remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. IVs include migrants’ location dummies and their interaction terms with the boy 
share variable. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.4: First-stage Regression Results for Table 2.4 on the Receipt of Remittances 
  
Dependent variable: 
Received remittances  
      (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Boy  0.212 0.019 
 
0.029  
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
(0.034)  
      
Age of the child 0.003 0.004 
 
 0.013  
 (0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.015)  
     
Number of school-age children 0.004 
 
0.004       0.003 
        in household (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
           
Household head's schooling years -0.005 * -0.005    -0.006  * 
  (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.003)   
           
Asset index -0.011 
 
-0.008 
*   **   -0.020 
         (0.015)  (0.014)   (0.018)  
           
Islam -0.122 
 
-0.027       -0.005 
        (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.040)  (0.043)   (0.040)  
           
Urban 0.075 
 
0.064   *   0.103 ** 
       (=1 if living in urban, 0 if in rural) (0.036)  (0.037)   (0.046)   
           
Migrant location: Urban Nigeria 0.506 ** 0.501   ***     0.518 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.038)  (0.041)   (0.047)   
      
Migrant location: Rural Nigeria 0.206 *** 0.191   ***      0.256 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.064)  (0.068)   (0.081)   
      
Migrant location: Europe 0.719 *** 0.720   ***     0.725 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.059)  (0.056)   (0.078)   
      
Migrant location: U.S. or Canada 0.694 *** 0.675   ***     0.736 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.094)  (0.093)   (0.120)   
           
Migrant location: Other Africa 0.443 *** 0.461   ***    0.371 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.089)  (0.093)   (0.104)   
           
Migrant location: Other regions 0.031 
 
0.031      0.051 
        (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.151)  (0.177)   (0.126)  
 
         
Constant -0.023 
 
-0.026    -0.228 
   (0.047)  (0.045)   (0.262)  
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
R-squared 0.519   0.512     0.540   
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 66.5  61.8      43.3  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. The excluded IVs include migrants’ location dummies. Sample weights are used. 
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Table A.5: Impact of Remittances on Educational Expenditure (OLS estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Expenditure on education 
  
Households with children of: 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.051 0.039 
 
   0.052  
       (in the past 12 months) (0.036) (0.033) 
 
(0.040)  
             
Observations 1365   1186        735   
R-squared 0.301  0.316    0.350  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Expenditure on education and remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
Table A.6: Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment (OLS estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.091 *** 0.088 ** **    0.094 * 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
(0.007)  
    
 
  
Boy  0.052 ** 0.029 
 
   0.117 *** 
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
(0.040)  
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
R-squared 0.175  0.142   0.310  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.7: Differential Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment by Children’s Gender (OLS 
estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.135 *** 0.129    ***     0.140 ** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.007)   
           
Boy * Received remittances -0.076 ** -0.072 *     -0.078 
   (0.032)  (0.043)   (0.087)   
           
Boy  0.067 **  0.042     0.135 *** 
        (0.031)  (0.030)   (0.043)   
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
R-squared 0.177  0.143    0.311  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.8: Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment (IV estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.011 ** 0.009 **     0.014 * 
       (in the past 12 months) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.007)  
      
Boy  0.052 ** 0.029 
 
   0.117 *** 
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.026) (0.025) 
 
(0.039)  
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
R-squared 0.173   0.140     0.310   
F-statistic (Instrument) 56.5  48.9      46.4  
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.196  0.182   0.315  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. IVs include 
migrants’ location dummies. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
Table A.9: Differential Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment by Children’s Gender (IV 
estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.018 *** 0.015    **     0.023 *** 
       (in the past 12 months) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)   
           
Boy * Amount of remittances -0.013 *** -0.011 **     -0.016 **  
  (0.005)  (0.005)   (0.007)   
           
Boy  0.081 **  0.052     0.157 *** 
        (0.035)  (0.035)   (0.046)   
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
R-squared 0.174   0.141     0.309   
F-statistic (Remittance) 49.8  44.9      42.7  
F-statistic (Boy*Remittance) 28.2  26.7      23.9  
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.301  0.231    0.064  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. IVs include 
migrants’ location dummies and their interaction terms with the boy variable. Sample weights are 
used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.10: Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment (IV Probit) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.040 * 0.032 
** 
   0.063 ** 
       (in the past 12 months) (0.021) (0.023) 
 
(0.032)  
    
 
  
Boy  0.168 ** 0.085 
 
   0.411 *** 
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.083) (0.086) 
 
(0.148)  
             
Observations 3363   2456        907  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. IVs include 
migrants’ location dummies. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
Table A.11: Differential Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment by Children’s Gender (IV 
Probit) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.069 *** 0.059    **     0.094 *** 
       (in the past 12 months) (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.036)   
           
Boy * Amount of remittances -0.051 *** -0.048 ***     -0.054 
   (0.016)  (0.018)   (0.033)   
           
Boy  0.250 **  0.157     0.508  *** 
        (0.105)  (0.109)   (0.165)   
             
Observations 3363   2456        907   
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. IVs include 
migrants’ location dummies and their interaction terms with the boy variable. Sample weights are 
used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience.  
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Table A.12: Differential Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment by Children’s Gender (IV 
estimation) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–19) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–19) 
Received remittances  0.193 *** 0.170    **     0.203 *** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.076)  (0.074)  (0.079)   
           
Boy * Received remittances -0.151 *** -0.133 **     -0.148 ***  
  (0.053)  (0.062)   (0.057)   
           
Boy  0.108 ***  0.054     0.187   *** 
        (0.034)  (0.036)   (0.031)   
             
Observations 4007   2456        1551   
R-squared 0.188   0.142     0.306   
F-statistic (Remittance) 51.3  58.6      28.5  
F-statistic (Boy*Remittance) 27.1  30.1      29.2  
Over-identifying restrictions (p-value) 0.343  0.318    0.256  
Test Received remittances + 
Boy*Received remittances=0 (p-value) 0.405  0.518     0.453  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses.  
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. IVs include migrants’ location dummies and their interaction terms with the boy variable. Sample 
weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.13: Impact of Remittances on Educational Expenditure (IV estimation with migration 
prevalence rate per district) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Expenditure on education 
  
Households with children of: 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  0.819 ** 0.785 **    0.679 ** 
       (in the past 12 months) (0.368) (0.365) 
 
(0.328)  
             
Observations 1366   1187        736   
F-statistic (Instrument) 13.8  12.6      11.6  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Expenditure on education and remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. Migration prevalence rate per district is used as an IV. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
Table A.14: Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment (IV estimation with migration prevalence 
rate per district) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.302 *** 0.177 
** 
   0.553 ** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.115) (0.133) 
 
(0.228)  
    
 
  
Boy  0.045 * 0.027 
 
   0.096 *** 
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.025) (0.026) 
 
(0.036)  
             
Observations 3402   2483        919   
F-statistic (Instrument) 20.1  20.0      19.6  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Migration 
prevalence rate per district is used as an IV. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.15: Differential Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment by Children’s Gender (IV 
estimation with migration prevalence rate per district) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.343 ** 0.193        0.650 ** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.134)  (0.143)  (0.264)   
           
Boy * Received remittances -0.078 
 
-0.030 
 
    -0.199 
   (0.103)  (0.100)   (0.168)   
           
Boy  0.061  0.032     0.142  ** 
        (0.044)  (0.042)   (0.055)   
             
Observations 3402   2483        919   
F-statistic (Remittance) 10.5  10.0      10.3  
F-statistic (Boy*Remittance) 14.4  14.0      10.5  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. IVs include 
migration prevalence rate per district and its interaction term with the boy variable. Sample 
weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.16: Impact of Remittances on Educational Expenditure (IV estimation with bank account 
prevalence rate per district) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Expenditure on education 
  
Households with children of: 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Amount of remittances  1.448 ** 1.540 **    0.997 ** 
       (in the past 12 months) (0.660) (0.760) 
 
(0.392)  
             
Observations 1363   1185        734   
F-statistic (Instrument) 6.5  5.2        8.3  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Expenditure on education and remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. Bank account prevalence rate per district is used as an IV. Sample weights are 
used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
Table A.17: Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment (IV estimation with bank account 
prevalence rate per district) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.745 ** 0.512 
** 
   1.171 ** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.337) (0.364) 
 
(0.458)  
    
 
  
Boy  0.028 0.015 
 
   0.069  
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.032) (0.031) 
 
(0.054)  
             
Observations 3398   2481        917   
F-statistic (Instrument) 6.9  6.5        6.5  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Bank account 
prevalence rate per district is used as an IV. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
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Table A.18: Differential Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment by Children’s Gender (IV 
estimation with bank account prevalence rate per district) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.835 ** 0.625    ***     1.197 ** 
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.320)  (0.338)  (0.495)   
           
Boy * Received remittances -0.180 
 
-0.216 
 
    -0.058 
   (0.195)  (0.185)   (0.327)   
           
Boy  0.065  0.056     0.082   
        (0.066)  (0.062)   (0.103)   
             
Observations 3398   2481        917   
F-statistic (Remittance) 4.6  4.7       3.5  
F-statistic (Boy*Remittance) 4.5  4.4       3.6  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. IVs include bank 
account prevalence rate per district and its interaction term with the boy variable. Sample weights 
are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
Table A.19: Impact of Remittances on School Enrollment (IV estimation with the number of older 
siblings) 
  
  
Dependent variable: 
School enrollment 
       (=1 if in school, 0 otherwise)        
Sample group 
[1] [2] [3] 
All Ages 
(6–17) 
Compulsory Age 
(6–14) 
Non-
Compulsory 
Age (15–17) 
Received remittances  0.090 0.128 
** 
   0.130  
       (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) (0.169) (0.211) 
 
(0.103)  
    
 
  
Boy  0.007 0.029 
 
   -0.077 * 
       (=1 if child is male, 0 if female) (0.020) (0.026) 
 
(0.041)  
             
Observations 2876   2139        737   
F-statistic (Instrument) 36.6  38.0       50.8  
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. 
                2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                3. Remittances are transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Bank account 
prevalence rate per district is used as an IV. Sample weights are used. 
                4. All other control variables are included in the estimations, but not reported for convenience. 	
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Appendix B 
Figure B.1.a: Work Experience by Aggregated Employment Category 
 
 
 
Figure B.1.b: Work Experience by Disaggregated Employment Category (Formal Employment) 
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Figure B.1.c: Work Experience by Disaggregated Employment Category (Informal Employment) 
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Table B.1: Transition in Employment Status between 2007 and 2014 (Male Sample) 
                                                
                                              2014 
                                   
 2007 
Formal Informal     
Gov. Private Employer 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(nonag.) Self emp. 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(ag.) 
Casual 
worker 
Total 
(%) Obs. 
Fo
rm
al
 Government employee 82.9% 14.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 1.4% 0.9% 100% 216 
Private sector employee 2.5% 73.7% 1.6% 5.0% 7.5% 1.3% 8.2% 100% 1,351 
Employer 1.9% 9.3% 37.0% 20.4% 25.9% 5.6% 0.0% 100% 54 
Self emp. with temp. workers (nonag.) 0.0% 15.7% 9.4% 36.5% 23.9% 6.3% 8.2% 100% 159 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Self employment 1.8% 21.8% 2.8% 11.1% 46.1% 6.2% 10.1% 100% 386 
Self emp. with temp. workers (ag.) 0.0% 15.9% 3.7% 3.7% 18.7% 46.7% 11.2% 100% 107 
Casual worker 1.8% 45.4% 1.8% 5.6% 11.0% 1.5% 32.9% 100% 337 
  Observations 227 1,311 78 203 390 113 288 - 2,610 
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Table B.2: Transition in Employment Status between 2007 and 2014 (Female Sample) 
                                                
                                              2014 
                                   
 2007 
Formal Informal     
Gov. Private Employer 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(nonag.) Self emp. 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(ag.) 
Casual 
worker 
Total 
(%) Obs. 
Fo
rm
al
 Government employee 85.7% 13.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 100% 105 
Private sector employee 2.1% 83.5% 1.0% 6.2% 3.5% 0.0% 3.8% 100% 520 
Employer 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 66.7% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 12 
Self emp. with temp. workers (nonag.) 0.0% 5.9% 4.4% 53.7% 29.4% 2.9% 3.7% 100% 136 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Self employment 0.6% 7.6% 4.7% 38.4% 47.1% 1.2% 0.6% 100% 172 
Self emp. with temp. workers (ag.) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 60.0% 20.0% 100% 5 
Casual worker 0.0% 50.0% 2.2% 10.9% 4.3% 2.2% 30.4% 100% 46 
  Observations 102 492 23 185 142 10 42 - 996 
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Table B.3: Transition in Employment Status between 2007 and 2014 (Youth Sample) 
                                                
                                              2014 
                                   
 2007 
Formal Informal     
Gov. Private Employer 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(nonag.) Self emp. 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(ag.) 
Casual 
worker 
Total 
(%) Obs. 
Fo
rm
al
 Government employee 70.3% 27.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 100% 37 
Private sector employee 1.8% 75.5% 1.6% 7.0% 6.2% 0.6% 7.4% 100% 503 
Employer 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 37.5% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 100% 8 
Self emp. with temp. workers (nonag.) 0.0% 14.3% 19.0% 14.3% 42.9% 9.5% 0.0% 100% 21 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Self employment 0.0% 26.4% 1.4% 16.7% 38.9% 6.9% 9.7% 100% 72 
Self emp. with temp. workers (ag.) 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 4 
Casual worker 2.2% 61.1% 1.1% 7.8% 7.8% 2.2% 17.8% 100% 90 
  Observations 37 472 16 60 76 13 61 - 735 
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Table B.4: Transition in Employment Status between 2007 and 2014 (Adult Sample) 
                                                
                                              2014 
                                   
 2007 
Formal Informal     
Gov. Private Employer 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(nonag.) Self emp. 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(ag.) 
Casual 
worker 
Total 
(%) Obs. 
Fo
rm
al
 Government employee 85.6% 12.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 1.1% 0.7% 100% 284 
Private sector employee 2.6% 76.8% 1.4% 4.8% 6.5% 1.1% 6.9% 100% 1,368 
Employer 1.7% 5.2% 36.2% 27.6% 25.9% 3.4% 0.0% 100% 58 
Self emp. with temp. workers (nonag.) 0.0% 10.9% 6.2% 46.7% 25.2% 4.4% 6.6% 100% 274 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Self employment 1.6% 16.0% 3.7% 20.0% 47.5% 4.3% 6.8% 100% 486 
Self emp. with temp. workers (ag.) 0.0% 13.0% 3.7% 4.6% 17.6% 49.1% 12.0% 100% 108 
Casual worker 1.4% 41.3% 2.0% 5.8% 10.9% 1.4% 37.2% 100% 293 
  Observations 292 1,331 85 328 456 110 269 - 2,871 
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Table B.5: Transition in Employment Status between 2007 and 2014 (Low-Educated Workers Sample) 
                                                
                                              2014 
                                   
 2007 
Formal Informal     
Gov. Private Employer 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(nonag.) Self emp. 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(ag.) 
Casual 
worker 
Total 
(%) Obs. 
Fo
rm
al
 Government employee 59.1% 40.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 22 
Private sector employee 0.7% 69.9% 0.7% 6.2% 8.5% 1.4% 12.6% 100% 761 
Employer 0.0% 12.5% 37.5% 29.2% 12.5% 8.3% 0.0% 100% 24 
Self emp. with temp. workers (nonag.) 0.0% 10.7% 4.3% 45.5% 29.9% 2.7% 7.0% 100% 187 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Self employment 0.5% 16.6% 3.2% 18.7% 46.6% 6.1% 8.4% 100% 380 
Self emp. with temp. workers (ag.) 0.0% 15.1% 3.2% 5.4% 17.2% 45.2% 14.0% 100% 93 
Casual worker 1.7% 40.9% 2.1% 5.8% 11.0% 1.4% 37.1% 100% 291 
  Observations 25 760 43 232 349 87 262 - 1,758 
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Table B.6: Transition in Employment Status between 2007 and 2014 (Highly Educated Workers Sample) 
                                                
                                              2014 
                                   
 2007 
Formal Informal     
Gov. Private Employer 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(nonag.) Self emp. 
Self emp. 
with 
temp. 
workers 
(ag.) 
Casual 
worker 
Total 
(%) Obs. 
Fo
rm
al
 Government employee 85.6% 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 1.0% 1.0% 100% 299 
Private sector employee 3.6% 80.9% 2.0% 4.8% 5.0% 0.6% 3.2% 100% 1,110 
Employer 2.4% 4.8% 33.3% 28.6% 28.6% 2.4% 0.0% 100% 42 
Self emp. with temp. workers (nonag.) 0.0% 12.0% 12.0% 42.6% 20.4% 8.3% 4.6% 100% 108 
In
fo
rm
al
 
Self employment 3.4% 19.1% 3.9% 21.3% 46.1% 1.7% 4.5% 100% 178 
Self emp. with temp. workers (ag.) 0.0% 15.8% 5.3% 0.0% 21.1% 57.9% 0.0% 100% 19 
Casual worker 1.1% 62.0% 1.1% 7.6% 7.6% 2.2% 18.5% 100% 92 
  Observations 304 1,043 58 156 183 36 68 - 1,848 
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Table B.7: Sector Earnings Premium by Disaggregated Employment Types 
(Fixed Effects Estimations) 
Dependent variable: 
Real hourly earnings (in natural 
logs) 
Sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]       [6]   [7] 
All  Male Female Youth Adult      Low      Edu. 
High 
Edu. 
           
Currently government sector  0.221 ** 0.227 *   0.290        0.096  0.250 ** -0.015  0.425 *** 
       employee  (0.098) (0.119)  (0.186)   (0.209)  (0.109)  (0.157)  (0.131) 
           
Currently private sector  0.154 *** 0.110 *    0.314  *     0.192  0.181    *** 0.140 * 0.285 *** 
       employee  (0.057) (0.062)  (0.163)   (0.117)  (0.066)  (0.074)  (0.095) 
           
Currently employer  0.121 0.087  0.032       0.462  0.011  -0.094  0.332 * 
 (0.139) (0.166)  (0.287)   (0.307)  (0.162)  (0.247)  (0.172)  
           
Currently self-employed with  0.023 0.079  -0.105     -0.125  0.010  0.014  0.078 
       temp. workers (non-agri.) (0.088) (0.102)  (0.210)   (0.220)  (0.097)  (0.113)  (0.146) 
           
Currently self-employed  -0.028 -0.016  -0.164     -0.044  -0.021  -0.81  0.195  
       without other workers (0.076) (0.081)  (0.228)   (0.190)  (0.084)  (0.099)  (0.121) 
             
Currently self-employed with  0.093 0.093  -0.085     -0.296  0.049  0.055  0.210 
       temp. workers (agri.) (0.166) (0.175)  (0.460)   (0.699)  (0.174)  (0.191)  (0.297) 
            
              
Observations 7,212   5,220    1,992        1,470  5,742  3,516  3,696  
R-squared 0.24  0.26      0.24        0.44  0.21  0.22  0.32 
Notes:  1. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
3. Individual and year fixed effects, cumulative years of experience in respective employment types and their 
quadratic and cubic terms, industry dummy variables, occupation dummy variables, a first year job dummy, 
province dummy variables, an urban dummy, and a constant are included in all estimations, but not reported. 
4. For the current employment type dummy variables, casual workers are the reference group. 
 
 	
